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 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
The human heart is the first home of democracy  
-Terry Tempest Williams (Nepo 2005: 231) 
 
     This inquiry explores leadership in education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.  
It examines how the Iraqi Kurds, politically and socially marginalized within the greater 
Middle East, remain steadfast in their orientation towards a better future.  The Statement 
of the Research Issue delineates policies and axial moments in Iraqi Kurdish history that 
have inhibited appropriate education policy.  It also speaks to events in Iraq that have 
created new possibilities of being.  The Background to the Research Issue expands and 
elaborates on what has contributed to the Kurdish issue and provides requisite 
information in understanding the historical context of the study.  Finally, the Significance 
of the Study offers how this research holds special importance for the University of 
Salahaddin in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq. 
Statement of the Research Issue 
Kurdistan lies in the strategic heart of the 
Middle East (See Figure One).  This position has 
fomented tyranny, violence, and repression. Under 
the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath 
Party Kurdish students were threatened, coerced 
and intimidated. They were denied legitimate 
academic achievement and were arbitrarily 
imprisoned, tortured, and even executed. Many fled into Diaspora.  In Diaspora they were 
Figure One-Map of Kurdistan in Dark Gold 
(Kurdistan Iraq outlined in fuchsia, oil fields in black) 
in fuchsia) 
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forced to study in a foreign language. The collapse of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord, 
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Anfal Campaign (1986-1989), and the quelling of the 
1991 Kurdish uprising were cycles of violence and repression. The de facto independence 
of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in 1991, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in 1992, the deposition of Saddam Hussein and the banning of the Iraqi 
Ba‟ath Party in 2003, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of March 2004, the 
democratic elections and Iraqi constitution of 2005, and the unification of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government in 2006, have encouraged hope and imagination of a better future 
for the Kurds. Specifically, the research issue addressed in this study is the inappropriate 
education policies of Saddam Hussein Tikriti and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party against the Kurds 
of Iraq from 1968-2003.   
Background to the Research Issue 
     Although the former dictator Saddam Hussein was executed on December 30, 2006 
for killing 148 Shi‟a Arabs, and Ali Hassan Al-Majid, “Chemical Ali,” is awaiting 
execution for his crimes against humanity in the Anfal campaign, justice has not been 
served.  Memories of the atrocities are fresh and the wounds remain unhealed. The 
following brief overview of the Ba‟ath Party and its policies against the Kurds is a 
compilation of general information from the Library of Congress Country Study “Iraq: 
The Emergence of Saddam Husayn 1968-79,” the 1994 Human Rights Watch publication 
“Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words,” the 1995 Human 
Rights Watch/Middle East publication Iraq‟s Crime of Genocide, David McDowall‟s 
2004 A Modern History of the Kurds, the International Center for Transitional Justice 
January 22, 2008 briefing paper “Iraq‟s New „Accountability and Justice‟ Law,” and the 
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Kurdistan Regional Government‟s website www.krg.org. The background events, rather 
than being chronological in order, interweave and overlap.  
The Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party 
     Al Ba’ath, Arabic for resurrection or renaissance, is formally the Ba‟ath Arab Socialist 
Party and was founded in Damascus, Syria on April 7, 1947.  A secular, largely 
reactionary political movement, Ba‟athism combines Arab socialism, militarism, 
nationalism, and pan-Arabism. Early Syrian Ba‟athists opposed European influence in 
their country‟s affairs and sought a “rebirth” or “renaissance” of Arab nationalism.  
Although the Party used the notion of unifying the Arab world as a platform and claimed 
to speak for the entire Arab nation, it remained factional and relied on nationalist radicals 
in the military. The Ba‟ath Party‟s motto of Wahdah, Hurriyah, and Ishtirrakiya, 
translates as “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.”  Unity here refers to pan-Arab unity, 
freedom emphasizes freedom from Western interests in particular, and socialism 
specifically references Arab socialism.  Kurds are not Arabs.  They are a distinct ethnic 
group with a distinct language and culture.  They are democratic and continue to seek a 
pluralistic, federal system within Iraq. 
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party 
     The Iraqi branch of the Ba‟ath Party was established in 1954, first came to power in 
February 1963, and then ruled Iraq from 1968 until 2003.  An elaborate apparatus, the 
Ba‟ath Party grew parallel to, and then later overtook, the normal institutions of the state.  
Although the inner workings of the Party were secret and membership was originally 
quite restricted, Ba‟ath Party officials were highly visible in their communities as 
informants and enforcers of extra-judicial detentions and penalties. Rules for Ba‟ath Party 
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membership were significantly relaxed in the 1990s as the regime sought to bolster its 
stability.  Membership is reported to have expanded greatly.  An estimated 2.5 million 
Iraqis were Ba‟ath Party members at the time of the 2003 liberation. 
The De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society 2003-2008 
     On May 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority, under the direction of Paul 
Bremer, began a de-Ba‟athification of Iraqi society.  The initiative, which was based on 
the de-Nazification of Germany after World War II, called for complete dissolution of the 
Iraqi army, the intelligence services, and banned anyone who had been a member of the 
higher tiers of the Party from government employment. Anarchy and violence ensued in 
the power vacuum that followed.  Much of the Sunni Arab insurgency plaguing Iraq was 
thought to be centered on dismissed military men from the Ba‟athist regime. On January 
12, 2008 a new legislation entitled the Accountability and Justice Law was approved.  It 
created a three month period for ex-members of the Ba‟ath to be challenged, after which 
they would be immune from prosecution over the Saddam era.  The law excluded former 
members charged with crimes or still sought for them.  However, it granted state pensions 
to many former Ba‟athist employees even if they were not given new posts.  As of this 
writing the Accountability and Justice Law has not been fully implemented.   
The March 11, 1970 Peace Accord and its Collapse  
     In March of 1970 the Iraqi Ba‟ath Revolutionary Command Council and Kurdish 
leader Mustafa Barzani agreed to a fifteen-article peace plan.  The plan theoretically gave 
significant cultural, political, and economic rights to the Kurds. General Barzani was 
allowed to retain his Kurdish Peshmerga troops and the Kurdistan Democratic Party was 
granted official recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people.  
However, the legal status of the Kurdish territory within Iraq remained unresolved.  The 
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agreement was never fully implemented and unraveled throughout the early 1970s.  After 
the March 1974 Ba‟ath attempt to assassinate General Barzani and his son Idris, full scale 
fighting broke out.  Saddam Hussein officially reneged on the peace accord in Algiers on 
March 6, 1975 by signing an agreement with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran.  
The agreement with the Shah recognized the disputed boundaries of the Shatt al Arab 
waterway, legalized the Shah‟s abrogation of the 1937 treaty in 1969, and dropped all 
Iraqi claims to Iranian Khuzestan and to the islands at the foot of the Persian Gulf.  In 
return, the Shah agreed to prevent subversive elements (Kurds) from crossing the border, 
ending Iranian assistance to the Kurds.  Iraqi forces almost immediately defeated the 
Peshmerga.  Under an amnesty plan, about 70 percent of the Peshmerga surrendered to 
the Iraqis.  Some remained in the mountains of Kurdistan to continue the fight, and about 
30,000 crossed the border to Iran to join the civilian Kurdish refugees, estimated to be 
between 100,000 and 200,000. 
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) 
 
     The Iran-Iraq War, a protracted military conflict between the two nations, began on 
September 22, 1980 with an Iraqi land and air invasion of western Iran. Saddam Hussein 
reneged on the agreement with the then deposed Shah of Iran and claimed the attack was 
again a territorial dispute over the Shatt al Arab waterway.  Iranian leader Ruhollah 
Khomeni declared that Iran would not cease fighting until Saddam‟s regime was 
overthrown. Finally in July 1988, Iran was forced to accept a United Nations mandated 
cease-fire.  The estimated number of dead from the conflict ranges from 1 to 1.5 million.  
Both sides held thousands of POWs for many years.  Several prisoner exchanges and 
releases occurred after 1988 with the final exchange taking place in 2003. 
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The Anfal Campaign (1986-1989) 
   The Anfal campaign was an anti-Kurdish crusade led by the regime of Saddam Hussein 
between 1986 and 1989.  The campaign takes its name from Surat Al-Anfal, an Arabic 
term for the eighth chapter of the Islamic holy Qur’an referring to “the spoils of war.”  
The former Iraqi Ba‟athist regime, like Hitler‟s regime of Nazi Germany, used 
euphemistic code words for its genocidal operation against the Kurds of southern 
Kurdistan.  According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the Anfal 
campaign took an estimated 182,000 civilian Kurdish lives. 
     Ali Hassan Al-Majid, cousin to Saddam Hussein, was in charge of the operation.  The 
Anfal campaign included the use of firing squads, mass deportations, rockets fired from 
helicopter gun ships, and chemical weapons.  The Halabja poisonous gas attack of 1988, 
considered part of Anfal, took an estimated 5,000 civilian lives, including those of babies 
and children.  
     Arabization, another major element of Anfal, utilized heavy population redistribution.  
Saddam Hussein‟s regime built public housing facilities in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as 
part of Arabization.  The redistribution promised poor Arabs from Iraq‟s southern regions 
affordable housing in exchange for relocating to Kirkuk.  Kurdish families were forced 
from their homes. The Kurds view Arabization as a form of ethnic cleansing and see the 
Arabs as a barrier to Kirkuk‟s recognition as a Kurdish city and a regional seat.  Article 
140 of the Iraqi constitution calls for a “normalization and census concluding with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of the people.” 
This referendum to reverse the policy of Arabization was to take place by the end of 
2007. On December 26, 2007 the Kurdistan National Assembly approved the UN‟s 
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suggestion to delay the referendum for six months until the end of June 2008. As of this 
writing negotiations are ongoing over provincial elections and Article 140 of the Iraqi 
constitution has not been implemented. 
The 1991 Kurdish Uprising 
     On March 6, 1991, during the course of the Gulf War, Kurdish citizens in Rania rose 
up in revolt against the central government of Saddam Hussein.  The uprising spread 
rapidly throughout the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq. All the major Kurdish cities, 
including the important oil center of Kirkuk, came under Kurdish control.  Within three 
weeks, however, Iraqi government troops returned and brutally crushed the revolt.  Over 
a million civilian Kurds fled across the mountains to neighboring Iran and Turkey.  In the 
ensuing fighting and refugee crisis, the United States and Britain established a “safe 
haven” policed with a no-fly zone covering much of the Kurdish territory and forced the 
Iraqi regime to establish a modus vivendi with the Kurds.  Most of the Kurdish population 
came down from the mountains and returned to their homes.  A volatile relationship 
between the Iraqi central government and the Kurds endured until the end of October 
1991.  The Iraqi troops, unable to assert central government control, withdrew 
unilaterally from most of the Kurdish areas excluding the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.  
The Kurdish Autonomous Region 
     The Kurdish Autonomous Region is the political entity established in 1970 following 
the autonomy accord between Saddam Hussein and Mustafa Barzani.  A legislative 
assembly was established in the city of Erbil with theoretical authority over the Kurdish 
populated provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymania.  In practice the assembly was 
under the control of Saddam Hussein until the 1991 uprising against his rule. The 
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Kurdish region thus gained de facto independence being ruled by the two principle 
Kurdish parties; the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK).  Elections held in June 1992 produced an inconclusive outcome with 
the assembly divided almost equally between the two main parties and their allies.  This 
led to tensions, which ultimately sparked violence and the collapse of the autonomous 
government.  Heavy fighting broke out on several occasions: May 1994, September 1996, 
and November 1997, killing thousands.  Saddam Hussein reasserted some power through 
assisting the KDP to capture Erbil in 1996. The region was essentially divided between 
the KDP and the PUK.   
The Kurdistan Regional Government 
     Since 1996 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been based in Erbil.  The 
KRG has a parliament and a cabinet.  Mr. Nechervan Idris Barzani has been the prime 
minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government since 1999.  The president of the Region 
is Mr. Massoud Barzani.  The main Kurdish parties and the Peshmerga collaborated with 
the coalition during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq that led to the demise of Saddam 
Hussein.  They subsequently came to be represented in the Iraqi Governing Council. On 
January 30, 2005 the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) for the State of Iraq 
recognized the autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government during the interim 
between full sovereignty and the eventual adoption of a permanent constitution.  The 
KRG currently has constitutionally recognized authority over the provinces of Erbil, 
Dohuk, and Sulaymania, as well as defacto authority over parts of Diyala, Ninawa, and 
Kirkuk. 
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The 2003 Liberation of Iraq and the 2005 Elections 
     The March 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein and his Ba‟athist regime is referred to as the 
“Liberation of Iraq” by the Kurds. Following the liberation, democratic elections were 
held on January 30, 2005.  The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won a 
commanding majority in the Kurdistan National Assembly of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government.  This allowed Mr. Jalal Talabany of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be 
elected the Iraqi Interim President on April 6, 2005.  Kurdistan Regional Government 
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, in a speech to the Kurdish Women‟s International 
Conference held April 9-10 2005 in Stockholm, had the following to say of this axial 
moment in Kurdish history: 
Now we are in the beginning of a phase in which Kurdish and Kurdistani forces will have 
direct responsibility for political decisions . . . In our delicate stage we should not forget 
that we in Kurdistan will face major difficulties in the months to come with those 
political forces coming to power for the first time.  If we do not act consciously, if we do 
not coordinate our efforts and if we do not ensure that our acts are backed by an 
overwhelming majority of the people in Kurdistan, we might risk losing a greater part of 
our gains.  At this stage, we must encourage those democratic forces that support our 
hard struggle not to forget us; not to ignore us in our urgent work; not to stop hearing us 
when we raise our voice asking for their support; and not to close their eyes when they 
see us fleeing.  I am saying all this because we all have witnessed these kinds of acts in 
our life time.  The greatest dream of Kurdistan and the Kurds is not to witness similar 
acts again.  Our major task should be that we, together, in agreement, collectively and 
with the support of democratic forces, reconstruct Kurdistan in a way we all should be 
proud of. 
 
The Iraqi Constitution of October 15, 2005 
 
     On October 28, 2005 Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani 
emphasized that Iraq‟s five million Kurds were in favor of the country‟s new constitution 
and that “The people of Kurdistan are committed to the constitution as the guarantor of 
the unity of Iraq.”  He acknowledged that the charter did not meet all the aspirations of 
the Kurdish people, namely their support for independence, but that the Kurds recognize 
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the difference between what they wish and desire and what they can actually achieve.  He 
added, “This is why the Kurdish people support the constitution, which recognizes and 
guarantees their hard-won autonomy.” 
Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government on May 7, 2006 
     The May 7, 2006 unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government was a landmark 
victory for the Kurdish region. The second paragraph of the document reads as follows: 
We must secure and guarantee the historic achievements of our people and the realization 
of our full and just rights by putting in place and implementing the permanent 
constitution, establishing a genuine federal and democratic Iraq; restoring Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, and other Arabized areas to the embrace of the Kurdistan 
Region, and developing and growing the democratic experience in the Kurdistan Region 
with further strengthening of stability and liberty through the creation of a lasting 
unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government. 
 
     In January of 2008 the Kurdistan Regional Government announced that Nechervan 
Idris Barzani would continue to serve as prime minister until the next election, which is 
scheduled for 2010. 
Significance of the Study 
     This study holds special significance for the University of Salahaddin in Erbil, 
Kurdistan, Iraq as higher education there moves farther away from a centralized, 
Arabized, tyrannical past, and moves closer to a federated, pluralistic, and democratic 
future. It is the aim of this dissertation to reflect critical issues in higher education policy 
development and to propose subsequent recommendations to be further evaluated by 
Kurdish leaders in both government and education.  Moreover, this research may provide 
information and understanding requisite for other higher education policy development 
and learning practices in this region of the world. 
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Summary and Forthcoming 
     Chapter One provides the reader with a statement of the research issue; how violence, 
tyranny, and repression have inhibited appropriate education policy in Kurdistan, Iraq.  It 
provides background to the research issue; how certain events and policies of the Iraqi 
Ba‟ath Party were cycles of violence and repression against the Kurds.  It also offers how 
more recent events; the 2003 Liberation of Iraq, the democratic Iraqi elections and the 
new Iraqi constitution have fostered hope and encouraged new ways of being for the 
Kurds. The significance of the study is that it can provide a deeper understanding of the 
context in which appropriate education policy could develop at the University of 
Salahaddin. Forthcoming in this dissertation is Chapter Two; Three; Four; Five; Six; 
Seven; Eight; and Nine. Chapter Two provides a background of Kurdistan.  Chapter 
Three covers a review of the literature.  Chapter Four addresses the research process.  
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven provide a presentation of the data.  Chapter Eight provides 
an analysis of the data.  And finally, Chapter Nine offers a summary, findings, 
implications, and personal reflections.  
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CHAPTER II 
 BACKGROUND OF KURDISTAN  
Introduction 
 
     Chapter Two chronicles the modern history of Kurdistan and offers an overview of the 
complex geopolitical, cultural and economic context within which the Kurds live in the 
Middle East. Conflict has defined much of modern Kurdish history.  At the end of World 
War I the boundaries of new nations were drawn to suit European interests and neglected 
local history, culture and traditions.  Nationalist movements arose. Chapter Two presents: 
Land and People, Language and Education, Religion, Economy, and The Kurds of Iraq 
1919-1970. A summary concludes the chapter.  
Land and People 
     The Kurdish homeland is a mountainous territory 230,000 to 300,000 square miles in 
area south of the Caucasus Mountains.  Equivalent to the size of France, it includes the 
Anatolian plain, the jagged ridges of the Zagros Mountains, and the immense 
Mesopotamian plain.  Although the Kurds have inhabited the area for more than 4,000 
years, they do not belong to a specifically designated Kurdish state.  In 1514 Kurdistan 
was divided between the Ottoman and Persian empires following the battle of Chaldiran.  
At the end of World War I (1920-1923) Britain and France further altered the political 
contour of the Middle East by dividing Ottoman Kurdistan among Turkey (43% of the 
total area of Kurdistan), Iran (31%), Iraq (18%), Syria (6%), and the former Soviet Union 
(2%).  The Kurds in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) passed 
into that area when territories were ceded by Persia from 1807-1820 and by the Ottomans 
in 1878 (Meho 2002: 3-4).  Lennox (2001: 13) estimates the Kurds to number 19 million 
in Turkey (28.4% of the population), 6.4 million in Iraq (24%), 9 million in Iran (12.6%) 
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and 1.6 million in Syria (9.2%).  The largest concentrations of Kurds outside of Kurdistan 
are in the major cities of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the former Soviet republics; in two 
Kurdish enclaves in central and north-central Anatolia in Turkey; in Khurasan in 
northeast Iran, and in southern Turkmenistan (Meho 2001: 4).  There are populations in 
Russia, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine.  An estimated 200,000 Jewish Kurds live in 
Israel.  The Diaspora in Europe numbers from 1 to 1.5 million.  The USA and Canada are 
home to approximately 35,000 Kurds and Australia is home to some 12,000 Kurds 
(Lennox 2001: 13).  The Kurds comprise the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle 
East after Arabs, Persians, and Turks (Meho 2001: 4).    
     Anthropologically, the Kurds are predominantly of Mediterranean ethnic stock, 
resembling southern Europeans and the Levantines in skin, general coloring and 
physiology.  There is yet a persistent recurrence of two racial substrata: a darker 
aboriginal Palaeo-Caucasian element, and more localized occurrence of blondism of the 
Alpine type in the heartland of Kurdistan.  Historically, Kurdish society has been tribal.  
Accordingly, the loyalty of the Kurds is primarily directed towards the immediate family 
clan; the cornerstone of the social system, and then to the tribe, the largest grouping 
within Kurdish society.  The cohesion of the Kurdish tribe is based on a mixture of blood 
ties and territorial allegiances associated with strong religious loyalties.  Many Kurds, 
until recently, only occasionally showed loyalty to a nation, state, or any other entity.  
This continues to be present today but it is in steady decline.  The socio-economic and 
political changes that most Kurds have witnessed since the 1960s such as the 
mechanization of agriculture, industrialization, subsequent revolts, rural-urban migration, 
emigration, political mobilization in party politics, the expansion of public education and 
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mass communications, have weakened the tribal structure of  Kurdish society and 
provided an impetus for developing larger Kurdish nationalism (van Bruinessen 1992).  
Language and Education  
     The Kurds speak various dialects of Kurdish that can be divided into two main groups.  
The Kurmanji group, which is spoken by more than 75 percent of the Kurds and 
composed of two major branches: Bahdinani (or North Kurmanji) the most widely 
spoken dialect, and Sorani (or Central Kurmanji).  The Pahlawani group, spoken by the 
rest of the Kurds, is also composed of two major branches:  Dimili (or Zaza or Hawrami) 
and Gorani (or Kermshahi or South Kurmanji).  All of these major dialects are further 
divided into scores of sub-dialects yet all are members of the north-western division of 
the Iranic branch of the Indo-European family of languages (Izady 1992: 172-182). 
     In their attempts to suppress Kurdish identity and revivalism, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and the former Soviet Union have used political and cultural oppression and economic 
exploitation.  The forms in which cultural oppression have been implemented vary. The 
following are brief summaries of state policies towards the Kurdish language: 
   After the creation of modern Turkey in 1923, Ataturk decided to substitute the alphabet 
used in Turkish from Arabic to Latin.  Consequently, the Kurds of Turkey were forced to 
do the same and adapt a modified version of the Latin characters to Kurdish. This 
inhibited the exchange of literature between the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and the 
Kurds in Iran and Iraq.  The Kurds in Iran and Iraq continued to use a modified version of 
the Perso-Arabic alphabet.  Less than a year later (1924), new measures were introduced 
and implemented in Turkey with the aim of suppressing the Kurdish language.  These 
measures took the form of banning both the spoken and written use of Kurdish, and 
ensuring that education and information were only provided in Turkish or to those people 
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who spoke Turkish.  Possession of written material in Kurdish became a crime 
punishable by imprisonment.  Turkish repressive measures against the use of the Kurdish 
language have continued in varying degrees of severity; easing during civilian rule and 
strengthening during military rule (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001:6).  On March 8, 2006 the 
Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council allowed two television channels and one 
radio station to have limited service in the Kurdish language.  This legislation came into 
force as an effort to meet one of the European Union‟s requirements for its membership 
talks with Turkey.  Despite these reforms, however, the use of Kurdish in the public 
sphere and government institutions is still severely restricted.  Turkish remains the only 
official language in Turkey and use of any other language as a first language is not 
allowed in schools (www.nvtc.gov). 
     In Iran, speaking and writing in Kurdish were absolutely forbidden by law.  Only in 
the 1990s, due to pressure from Kurdish revolutionaries there, did the Kurds begin to 
publish material in Kurdish more openly and use the language in many other cultural 
activities. Kurdish literature and histories are available in Iran in both Kurdish and 
Persian (Blau 2007).  
     In Iraq, the spoken use of Kurdish and the publication of Kurdish literature were 
guaranteed by the 1932 Constitution.  In 1958 the Kurdish language was officially 
recognized as the second language of the country and was used and studied in schools 
and universities (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992: 76).  However, the Kurds struggled 
against official animosity from the Iraqi regime on implementation of their constitutional 
right to speak Kurdish from 1958 onwards until Article 9 of the TAL (Transitional 
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Administrative Law) of March 8, 2004.  Article 4 of the Iraqi constitution approved by 
national referendum on October 15, 2005 states the following in reference to language: 
First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of 
Iraq.  The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as 
Turcoman, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational 
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private 
educational institutions. 
Second:  The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the 
provisions shall be defined by a law and shall include: 
A.  Publication of the Official Gazette, in two languages; 
B.  Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as the Council of               
Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the 
two languages; 
C. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two 
languages; 
D.  Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with educational 
guidelines; 
E.  Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality such as bank 
notes, passports, and stamps. 
Third:  The federal and official institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region shall use 
both languages. 
Fourth:  The Turcoman language and the Syriac language are two other official languages 
in the administrative units in which they constitute density of population. 
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Fifth:  Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an additional 
official language if the majority of its population so decides in a general referendum.     
     This is the first time in Iraqi Kurdish history, with the implementation of Article 4, 
that the constitutional right to speak Kurdish is being upheld. 
      In Syria, although 90 percent of the Kurds use Kurdish in their everyday life, the use 
of the Kurdish language in any form is still against the law.  Despite the greater tolerance 
the Syrian government showed in the 1990s towards its Kurdish minority, the 
government still prohibits the use of Kurdish in schools and forbids broadcasting and 
publishing in the language (McDowall 1998).   
     In the former Soviet Union the Kurdish language was encouraged before World War 
II.  After the war, however, the assimilation processes carried out by the resettlement 
campaigns of Stalin discontinued Kurdish as the medium of instruction in schools.  
Cultural isolation of the Soviet Kurds from their brethren across the borders, a 
consequence of changing the alphabet into Cyrillic, and the marginalized status of the 
Kurds in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, have contributed to an ineffective 
development of the Kurdish language in these areas (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001:7).  
Religion 
    At least two thirds of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi‟is School of Law in 
contrast to Arab and Turkish Sunnis who adhere mostly to the Hanafi School, and Azeris 
and Persians who are Shi‟a Muslims (Van Bruinessen 1991:7).  There are, however, 
many Shi‟a Kurds concentrated in Kurdistan of Iran and in the districts of Khanaqin and 
Mandali in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Most of the remaining Kurds are adherents of heterodox, 
syncretistic sects.  Such sects include the Alevis (or the Qizilbash) with an estimate of 
more than three million; the Ahl-i Haqq („People of Truth‟ or the Kaka‟is), and the 
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Yezidis.  There are also several thousand Christian Kurds and more than 150,000 Jewish 
Kurds, most of who are residing today in Israel (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001: 8). 
     Until the mid-twentieth century, religion amongst the Kurds played a prominent role 
in the Kurdish nationalist movement.  Sheikhs led most of the Kurdish rebellions between 
the 1880s and the 1930s.  These rebellions were intensely influenced by the religious 
diversity of the Kurds.  The Sunnis, for example, were divided into tariqas or mystical 
orders.  The Naqshbandi and the Qadiri never cooperated effectively with each other in 
any of the rebellions instigated by either side‟s leaders.  The Shiite Kurds of Iran, on the 
other hand, never took part in the Kurdish national movement.  The Alevi Kurds, fearing 
Sunni fanaticism, did not support the rebellion of Sheik Sa‟id in 1925; the Alevis, 
conversely, received no support from Sunni Kurds in their rebellions of 1921 and 1937-
38 (van Bruinessen 1991: 7-14).  
Economy 
    Akram Jaff (2003) in his piece “The Fractured Economy of Kurdistan” describes 
Kurdistan as being endowed with rich natural resources.  Along with the minerals iron, 
gold, copper, and petroleum, it has rich soils in its valleys, sufficient rainfall in most of its 
territories, several permanently flowing rivers, a temperate climate, and skilled farmers 
and herdsmen.  The occupation of the majority of the Kurds is agriculture, which 
therefore plays a crucial role in their economy.  However, he says, Kurdistan‟s economy 
is stagnant and its technologies static.  Sound agricultural policies that benefit the Kurds 
are not followed.  The central planning administrations of the nation states of Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria have neglected development in the Kurdish areas.  The following 
statistics (Table Two) on the Kurdish economy are intended to show the distribution of 
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resources amongst the four nation states.  They are slightly different from the population 
estimates of Lennox (2001: 13), yet population estimates vary on the Kurds due to 
inaccurate census.  The economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is much improved since the 2003 
Liberation of Iraq, although statistics are not currently available. 
Economic Statistics 
 
Table Two Akram Jaff 2003 “The Fractured Economy of Kurdistan.” 
 
 
The Kurds of Iraq 1919-1970 
     At the end of World War I Britain created the state of Iraq.  Initially it was planned to 
unite the two Arab provinces of Basra and Baghdad.  This union would then lie within 
British jurisdiction under the provisions of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement.  However, 
oil was discovered in the predominantly Kurdish province of Mosul and Mosul was 
occupied by the British in November 1918 (still under Ottoman jurisdiction) despite the 
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Armistice of Mudros signed on October 31, 1918.  Britain was aware that the population 
of Mosul was mainly Kurdish.  The British plan was to set up one or several semi-
autonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to the emerging state of Iraq.  The 
Kurds were against being included in Iraq.  Eventually, they came into direct 
confrontation with the British authorities (Chaliand 1993:143).  From 1919 to the mid-
1940s, there was a long series of Kurdish rebellions against the British army and the Iraqi 
regime for some form of real autonomy.  All attempts by Sheik Mahmud Barzinji and the 
Barzanis (Sheik Ahmad and Mullah Mustafa) failed.  However, with the overthrow of the 
British monarchy on July 14, 1958 by General Abd al-Karim Qassim, the Kurdish 
national movement in Iraq re-emerged powerfully.  General Qassim‟s coup de’ etat 
raised Kurdish expectations for more equal participation in the state.  Qassim welcomed 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani back from exile and jointly they dealt with many mutual 
enemies.  Hoping to gain some civil and cultural rights for the Kurds, General Barzani 
accepted to assist Qassim in his efforts to eliminate the government‟s opposition groups.  
However, Qassim‟s regime disappointed Kurdish hopes and, eventually, the Kurdish 
movement erupted again in 1961. Qassim failed to bring Barzani down and the war 
between the latter and successive Iraqi governments continued until the March 11, 1970 
Peace Accord between the Kurds and the Ba‟ath regime (McDowall 1996: 368-391). 
Summary  
     Chapter Two provides background to the complex geopolitical, cultural and economic 
context within which the Kurds live in the Middle East. The chapter examines: Land and 
People, Language and Education, Religion, Economy and The Kurds of Iraq 1919-1970.  
Chapter Three provides a review of the literature.  
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction     
     This chapter provides a review of the literature in English, accomplished within the 
context of the research categories Memory, Promise, and Imagination, that addresses 
selected aspects of the challenges faced by Kurdish leaders in education policy 
development in Kurdistan, Iraq. These aspects are reflected in the corresponding 
subsections of: A History of Conflict, Education Policy, Economy and Development, 
Diaspora, Human Rights Abuses, and Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Statehood.  A 
summary concludes the chapter.   
Memory 
     In his piece on memory and forgetting Paul Ricoeur (1999:8) speaks of the difficulty 
of preserving one‟s identity through time.  This difficulty of identity preservation he sees 
as having three components.  The first component is that of dealing with change through 
time.  The second is the threat of the Other.  Ricoeur believes that humiliations, real or 
imaginary, are linked to this threat when this threat is felt as a wound which leaves scars.  
The third component of preserving one‟s identity through time and preserving one‟s 
selfhood in the face of the Other is the violence which Ricoeur sees as a permanent part 
of human relationships and interactions. Most events that have to do with the founding of 
any community, according to Ricoeur, are acts and events of violence.  He states, 
“Collective identity is thus rooted in founding events which are violent events.  In a 
sense, collective memory is a kind of storage of such violent blows, wounds and scars” 
(1999:8).  For the Kurds, these wounding events of memory have been made manifest 
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through a history of conflict and domination, repressive education policies, and 
entrenched underdevelopment. 
A History of Conflict 
     David McDowall in A Modern History of the Kurds states, “With the Arab conquests 
the Kurds emerged from historical obscurity, rapidly confirming the longevity of their 
reputation for political dissidence” (2004: 21).  The Kurds first came into contact with the 
Arab armies in 637 with the latter‟s conquest of Mesopotamia.  The Kurdish tribes had 
been an important element in the Sassanian Empire and initially gave it strong support as 
it tried to withstand the Muslim armies, between 639 and 644.  Once it was clear the 
empire was doomed, the Kurdish chiefs one by one submitted to the Arab armies and to 
Islam.  The pattern of nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab or 
subsequently Turkic, alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible, 
became an enduring theme in Kurdish political life.  This history of conflict and 
domination is chronicled by the following authors: Atarodi (2003), Fieldhouse (2002), 
Ghareeb (2003), Izady (1992), Kreyenbroek & Sperl (1992), Meiselas (1997), and Yildiz 
(2007). 
Education Policy 
     Amir Hassanpour (1993) in Knowledge, Culture and Power: International 
Perspectives on Literacy as Policy and Practice describes the struggle of the Kurdish 
people to promote their national language and education while under the control of 
hostile Ottoman, Arab, and Persian empires.  With forced foreign-language education and 
lack of political independence, the Kurds found it difficult to develop a literate tradition 
in their native tongue.  Hassanpour believes there is an intimate connection between state 
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power and literacy in the process of gaining independence for a unified nation.  In The 
Non-Education of the Kurds: A Kurdish Perspective Hassanpour (1996) puts forth that 
educational provision in Kurdistan violates most of the language-in-education 
requirements of international law.  He holds that the same is true for the Kurds in 
Diaspora in most parts of the world.  He believes that the future of Kurdish education 
depends to a large extent on the political situation in the Middle East.  And finally, 
Hassanpour argues that only a democratic Kurdistan could promote education that fosters 
nation building, self-determination, and autonomy.  Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Sertac 
Bucak (1994) in “Killing a Mother Tongue-How the Kurds are Deprived of Linguistic 
Human Rights” show  how a clarification of concepts, here demonstrated by the concept 
of mother tongue, helps in analyzing lack of linguistic rights and in formulating the 
requirements for a universal declaration of linguistic human rights. Robert Phillipson and 
Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) in “Colonial Language Legacies:  The Prospects for 
Kurdish” establish how the oppression of the Kurdish language is outstandingly severe, 
and emphasize the importance of language rights for liberation.  They also consider 
whether the language policies of many states that were formerly colonies represent an 
example to follow. 
Economy and Development 
     A.C. Emmanuelsson (1995) in “Chasing the Rainbow: Economic and Social 
Constraints Facing Kurdish National Aspirations in Iraq” contends that the Iraqi 
government exploited the natural resources in and agricultural products of Kurdistan with 
little benefit to the Kurdish people.  He also states that forced migration and re-
settlements, with particular emphasis on the 1991 Gulf War, impeded economic 
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development in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Yosef Gotlieb (1991) in his doctoral dissertation Geo-
ethnic Imperatives of Development: The Inter-Dynamics of Territory, Society and State 
in the Third World advances the idea that entrenched underdevelopment in Kurdistan is 
due to the social and spatial configuration of post-colonial states and that the colonies 
were demarcated to further the economic and strategic interests of the metropolitan 
powers.  Accordingly, the indigenization of colonial space in the form of the post-
colonial state perpetuates territorial incongruities between historical geo-ethnic regions 
and formal borders.  Gotlieb states that the historical and contemporary relationship of 
the Kurds to Kurdistan exemplifies both the integrity of ethnicity and territory and the 
disastrous consequences for development when this relationship is violated.  He 
concludes that the spatial realm of development activity should be defined by 
anthropological and ecological continuities.   
     Gotlieb (1996) in Development, Environment, and Global Dysfunction: Toward 
Sustainable Recovery argues that international growth oriented development is inevitably 
accompanied by poverty, environmental degradation, and socio-political unrest and that 
global priority must be re-ordered toward local development and sustainable 
communities.  In “Irreconcilable Planning:  The Transformation of Life-place into 
Economic Space in Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan” Gotlieb (1997) advances the idea that 
the violence found in Kurdistan is the outcome of two divergent views of the region.  On 
the one hand governments seek to rationalize and maximize the potential of Kurdish 
areas as a resource frontier rich in soils, water and minerals.  The official view of 
Kurdistan is based on its uses as economic space in the service of the state as a whole.  
For the Kurds, Gotlieb maintains, Kurdistan is life-place and represents the integrity of 
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the society-nature relations prevalent in the region since time immemorial.  Where the 
state centers see modernization and aggregate economic growth as the primary objective 
of their policies in all areas under their jurisdiction, the Kurds see economic exploitation 
and cultural imperialism.   
Promise 
     Paul Ricoeur (1999:13) states, “By acknowledging that the history of an event 
involves a conflict of several interpretations and memories, we open up the future.” This 
retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications.  According to 
Ricoeur, different political projects concerning the future invariably presuppose different 
interpretations of the past.  Utopian projects are about the unkept promises of the 
historical past being re-projected and re-animated in terms of a better future, which might 
realize such lost opportunities or unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities. Ricoeur believes it is 
here that we connect past and future in an exchange between memory and expectation.   
And that there is a permanent tension “between the space of experience and the horizon 
of expectation” (Rheinhart Kosselek in Ricoeur 1999:13).  According to Ricoeur this 
critical exchange between memory and expectation is fundamental to the working 
through of wounding events. 
     Ricoeur (1999: 9-10) speaks of Hanah Arendt (1992) in Chapter 5 of The Human 
Condition  entitled “Action” asking how it is possible that there be a continuation of 
action in spite of death, in spite of the erosion of traces.  Arendt brings together two 
conditions for what she calls the “continuation of action;” forgiving and promising.  To 
forgive, according to Arendt, is to basically be liberated from the burden of the past, to be 
untied or unbound, while promising enjoins the capacity to be bound by one‟s own word.  
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Arendt argues that only a human being is capable of being unbound through forgiveness 
and bound through promising. Unkept promises and betrayed possibilities of the Iraqi 
Ba‟ath Party resulted in expulsion of the Kurds into Diaspora and human rights abuses.  
Diaspora  
     Most of the literature on the Kurdish Diaspora primarily focuses on the difficulties 
refugees encounter living in contemporary Europe, Canada, and the United States.  
However, Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen (2000) in “Trans-state Loyalties and Politics of Turks 
and Kurds in Western Europe” advances that diaspora activities influence politics in the 
homeland and the host country.  In so doing, these activities challenge the distinction 
between domestic and foreign politics.  Osten Wahlbeck (1998) in Transnationalism and 
Diasporas: The Kurdish Example argues that the notions of transnationalism and diaspora 
can provide sociology with some conceptual tools needed to study migrants in an 
increasingly global world.  The author believes that the sociology of migration has much 
to gain from the contemporary diaspora discourse.  It is argued that the traditional way of 
looking at ethnic relations, in terms of a relation between strictly localized minorities and 
majorities, is inadequate to describe refugees‟ experiences.  The concept of diaspora 
understood as a transnational social organization relating to both the country of origin 
and the country of exile, can enhance understanding of the social reality in which 
refugees live.  Wahlbeck (1999) studies the diaspora communities in Britain and Finland 
that Kurdish immigrants and refugees from Turkish and Iraqi violence have shaped.  The 
author considers the ways and degrees in which kinship and communal ties survive 
violence.  The study elucidates the emergence of transnational institutions and makes the 
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theoretical case for replacing inadequate concepts of ethnicity with diaspora oriented 
approaches.  The next section focuses on human rights abuses. 
Human Rights Abuses 
     The Human Rights Watch (1994) document Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi 
Government in its Own Words was part of a wider effort by Middle East Watch to 
provide evidence that the Anfal campaign by the government of Iraq against its 
population of rural Kurds in 1988 amounted to genocide.  At the time, Middle East 
Watch was working toward bringing the case of genocide before the International Court 
of Justice at The Hague.  The documents were to constitute one important pillar of 
evidence in such a case.  Other evidence consisted of eyewitness testimonies collected by 
Middle East Watch in Northern Iraq in 1992 and 1993, and forensic evidence obtained 
there by Middle East Watch in collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights.  Some 
very important matches were made between documentary and testimonial evidence 
especially in relation to Iraq‟s repeated use, in 1987-1988, of chemical weapons against 
the Kurdish civilian population.  The Human Rights Watch (1995) book Iraq‟s Crime of 
Genocide combines findings from forensic missions (conducted jointly with Physicians 
for Human rights), eyewitness accounts, extensive interviews, and the study of eighteen 
metric tons of Iraqi state documents in arguing that the 1988 Anfal campaign against the 
Kurds in northern Iraq constituted genocide. An international conference on genocide at 
the Erbil Convention Center in Kurdistan, Iraq January 26-28, 2008 called on the Iraqi 
government to recognize the crimes in the Anfal operation as genocide against the 
Kurdish people.  The crimes were identified as genocide in a directive issued on 
September 12, 2008 by the Iraq Presidency Council.  This decision comes months after 
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the Iraqi Council of Representatives also unanimously voted on April 14, 2008 for a 
resolution recognizing the crimes as genocide (www.krg.org). Prime Minister Barzani 
addressed the conference in January 2008 and stated, “We must keep the memory of this 
tragedy alive and protect the rights and dignity of the families.  This progress should be 
made without allowing hatred or violence in our actions or work.”  He continued, “We 
want to take these steps within our fine culture of tolerance, peace, and a hopeful life.”  
Imagination 
     Ricoeur (1999:16) says that testimony is the ultimate link between imagination and 
memory, because the witness says “I was part of the story.  I was there.”  At the same 
time, the witness tells a story that is a living presentation and therefore deploys the 
capacity of imagination to place events before our eyes, as if we were there.  Testimony 
then would be a way of bringing memory and imagination together.  The role of “trust” is 
paramount.  When one testifies to something, they ask the other to believe what they are 
saying is true.  To share a testimony is an exchange of trust.  Most institutions rely 
fundamentally on the trust they place in the word of the other (Ricoeur 1999:15). 
     Ricoeur says that there is a “duty to remember” and that this duty is ethico-political as 
it has to do with the construction of the future.  He states: 
 . . . the duty to remember consists not only in having a deep concern for the past, but in 
transmitting the meaning of past events to the next generation.  The duty, therefore, is one 
which concerns the future; it is an imperative directed towards the future, which is 
exactly the opposite side of the traumatic character of the humiliations and wounds of 
history.  It is a duty thus to tell (1999:9). 
 
      The following is a review of the literature on the Kurdish struggle for autonomy, 
sovereignty, and statehood. 
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Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Statehood 
     The challenges Kurdish leadership face at present, many believe, can be attributed to 
the Kurds not belonging to a designated Kurdish state.  Massoud Barzani, descendent of 
the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and current president of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, in Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement (1931-
1961) speaks on successive Iraqi regimes since the formation of the Iraqi state and the 
perpetual suffering of all the Iraqi people.  He states: 
The Iraqis have suffered tremendous agony.  They have never tasted true liberty and 
independence.  Historically, they have found themselves either ruled by a Turkish 
Governor, a British Commissioner or a small band that leaped to power through a bloody 
coup d’etat.  They never elected a Parliament or a President freely, not even once.  They 
have never willingly pledged allegiance to a ruler.  The Iraqis are a people whose 
freedom has been usurped.  However, their rulers have ruled in their name, killed in their 
name, destroyed in their name, waged wars and compromised their sovereignty and 
independence all in their name.  The Iraqi people [has] never had the right to express [its] 
opinion.  All this happens while Iraq is being ruled by a political party claiming to be “the 
bearer of the banner of unity, freedom, and socialism” and accusing its predecessors of 
treason, dictatorship, and being agents [to foreigners] (2003:7). 
 
The aforementioned book was published prior to the 2003 Liberation of Iraq.   
      
     Martin van Bruinessen (1992:10) in his doctoral dissertation Agha, Shaikh and State: 
The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan puts forth that Kurdish nationalism and 
tribal and religious loyalties stand in an ambivalent relationship to each other.  On the one 
hand, the first Kurdish nationalists were from the ranks of the traditional authorities; 
shaikhs and aghas.  It was, van Bruinessen maintains, precisely because of the primordial 
loyalties to these leaders and to the values which they embodied that the nationalist 
movement acquired its mass character.  On the other hand, the perpetual conflicts and 
rivalries between these traditional leaders prevented the Kurds from really uniting.  This 
dissertation was written in 1992.   
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     Gerard Chailand (1993: 11) in A People without a Country says in the introduction 
that the Kurdish people have the unfortunate distinction of being probably the only 
community of over 15 million persons which has not achieved some form of national 
statehood, despite a struggle extending back over several decades.   
     Michael Gunter (1993) in “A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq” and Gunter 
(1992)  in The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope chronicles the background of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq and devotes his analysis in both cases to the 
uprising which followed the 1991 Gulf War.  At that time he offered that despite 
remaining difficulties there was now a reason to hope that the long nightmare of the 
Kurds might be nearing an end. 
     Gina Lennox (2001) in Fire, Snow & Honey: Voices from Kurdistan   asserts that 
water is the future‟s elixir and far more essential that oil.  She believes that as oil was to 
the 20
th
 century, water will be to the 21
st
, Kurdistan being rich in both.  As well, overland 
access to the oil-rich republics of the former Soviet Union is through Kurdistan.  Lennox 
states, “For these and other reasons of sovereignty and the strength of existing alliances, 
neither the ruling nation states nor their international allies want a united, independent 
Kurdistan, or a series of autonomous, federal states within present borders” (2001:13). 
     Abbas Vali (2003) in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism believes that the 
democratic doctrine of popular sovereignty is tied to the ethnic identity of the 
dominant/majority group/nation in the nation-state; this excludes non-sovereign ethnic 
and cultural identities from the democratic political process.  The conceptions of 
sovereignty and legitimacy entailed in democratic theory engender ethnic/national 
conflict, statelessness, and opposition to the modern nation-state. 
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     Shafiq Qazzaz, Minister of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation for the Kurdistan 
Regional Government until May 2006 when he retired, and a research participant in this 
study, wrote his doctoral dissertation at American University in 1971.  Entitled 
Nationalism and Cultural Pluralism: The Kurdish Case and timely today, he proposes that 
there are two views from which the Kurdish problem must be considered.  One is to see it 
as a manifestation of a belated nationalism which concerns itself with the problem of a 
divided people and territory, and the other would be to consider it a case of cultural 
plurality with which the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria must deal and solve in 
order to eliminate a chronic source of instability and tension in Middle Eastern politics.  
As a symbolic concept with common cultural characteristics, Kurdish nationalism is 
reflected in the Kurds‟ demand for autonomy, with the immediate objective of winning 
special recognition within each state.  As an ideology which seeks national goals, 
Kurdish nationalism is characterized by the demand of Kurdish independence.  Within 
this framework of locally as well as territorially promoted nationalist aspirations, the 
limitations inherent in Kurdistan‟s fragmented status have always had a retarding effect 
on the social transformation of Kurdish society and upon efforts to launch a unified 
nationalist movement.  Hence, organized Kurdish political efforts today range from the 
pursuit of fully articulated political objectives within the framework of an active and 
organized movement among the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan to the general lack of such 
organized nationalist efforts among the Kurds in Turkey.  
     There are different ways of dealing with humiliating memories (Ricoeur 1999:9); 
either we repeat them in the Freudian sense or we may try to extract the exemplarity of 
the event rather than the factuality (for exemplarity is directed towards the future; it is a 
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lesson to be told to following generations).  So whereas the traumatic character of past 
humiliations brings us back permanently towards the past, the exemplary dimension of 
the same events is directed towards the future and regulated towards justice.  It is the 
power of justice to be just regarding victims, just also regarding victors, and just towards 
new institutions by means of which we may prevent the same events from recurring in 
the future.  The mediating act of narrative opens the possibility of healing humiliating, 
traumatic memories, but in addition, Ricoeur believes, we still need “a body count.” He 
states, “You have to accurately count the corpses in the death camps as well as offering 
vivid narrative accounts that people will remember” (1999: 15).  Ricoeur says that it is 
precisely through narratives that a certain education of memory has to start (1999:9).  
Here we can introduce the connection between memory and forgetting in the construction 
of plots, in the elaboration of narratives concerning personal identity or collective 
identity.  That we cannot tell a story without eliminating or dropping some important 
event according to the kind of plot we intend to build.  
Summary 
      Chapter Three offers a review of the literature in English that addresses challenges 
faced by Kurdish leadership in education policy development in Iraq. The literature on a 
history of conflict, repressive policies against Kurdish education, and entrenched 
underdevelopment is reviewed in the Memory category.  In the category of Promise 
literature on the Kurdish Diaspora and human rights abuses is reviewed. The literature on 
Kurdish autonomy, sovereignty and statehood is addressed in the Imagination category.  
Chapter Four provides an account of the research process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RESEARCH PROCESS  
 
Introduction 
     This chapter is an account of my research process.  I observed research protocol in the 
participatory critical hermeneutic tradition as outlined in Herda (1999).  This tradition 
created the conditions to establish the research relationships and carry out the 
conversations.  In hermeneutical research Herda (1999: 86) states that “. . . language 
takes the place of the perceptual world of objects, so that texts become the objects from 
which human existence is indirectly understood or „read.‟”  A text (discourse fixed by 
writing [Ricoeur 1982: 143]) and social actions that are recorded (Herda 1990: 51) allow 
us to recognize, challenge, and evaluate our worlds of action as well as envision new, 
possible worlds.  Participatory critical hermeneutic research is an interpretive and moral 
act.  I undertook this privileged endeavor with hope to “leap ahead of the Other [the Iraqi 
Kurd] in his existential potentiality-for-Being . . . not in order to take away his „care‟ but 
rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time” (Heidegger 1962: 
159).  The objective of this research, as stated in Chapter One, is to reflect critical issues 
in education policy development and to offer subsequent recommendations for the 
University of Salahaddin.  Included in this chapter is the Theoretical Framework for the 
Research Project, Research Categories and Research Questions, The Pilot Study, Entrée 
to the Research Site, The Research Participants, The Data Collection Process, The Data 
Analysis Process, The Background of the Researcher, and a Summary. 
Theoretical Framework for the Research Project 
 
     In considering what the task of hermeneutical research is, Paul Ricoeur (1999: 43) 
states that “. . . hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of understanding in their 
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relation to the interpretation of texts.  So the key idea will be the realization of discourse 
as a text; and the elaboration of the categories of the text will be the concern of the 
subsequent study.”  This concept of text interpretation is the theoretical foundation for the 
present study. The other grounding theories are: Geertz‟ Theory of Interpretive 
Ethnography, the Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity and Threefold Mimesis, the 
Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care/Solicitude and Language, and the 
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality.  
Ricoeurian Theory of Text Interpretation 
     In his theory of text interpretation Paul Ricoeur advances that “the meaning of a text 
lies not behind the text but in front of it” (1982:177).  Ricoeur describes hermeneutics 
(1982:112) “as the explication of being-in-the world displayed by the text.  What is to be 
interpreted in the text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and in which I could 
project my ownmost possibilities.”  Ricoeur‟s (1982:181) theory of interpretation places 
emphasis on the “opening up of a world.”  This theory of interpretation recognizes the 
power of imagination, no longer the faculty of deriving “images” from our sensory 
experience, but the capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves 
with imagination treated as a dimension of language.   
Geertz’ Theory of Interpretive Ethnography 
     In contrasting traditional ethnographic anthropological study with interpretive 
ethnography Clifford Geertz sees the aim of anthropology as “the enlargement of the 
universe of human discourse” (1973: 14).  The importance of interpretive anthropology 
goes beyond an objective way of viewing or looking at culturally distinct beings.  It gives 
us a way to converse “with” others and derive meaning from those culturally rich 
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conversations.  Geertz sees this discourse as having meaning that is not immediately 
recognizable and hence needs interpretation.  Geertz, in defining interpretive ethnography 
or anthropological analysis, says it “is not a matter of methods” (1973: 6).  What does 
define it is “the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in „thick description‟” 
(1973: 6). 
Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity 
     Paul Ricoeur (1992:3) suggests that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such 
an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes 
into the other.  In considering appropriate education policy development in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity is reassuring.  Ricoeur (1992:3) posits 
that the nature of human beings is to embrace both a permanent and temporal aspect of 
identity.  These aspects of identity Ricoeur refers to as sameness (idem) and selfhood 
(ipse).  This dialectic of the self gives us a character, a set of lasting dispositions that 
remains the same throughout transitions in our life and also allows us to create a newness 
that houses the future (Herda 1999: 37).  
     Identity as sameness (idem) for the Kurds is reflected in their traditions, values, and 
ideals.  These traditions, norms, and values provide permanence; stability and identity 
over time.  Kurdish identity as selfhood (ipse) is embodied in the variability, 
discontinuity, and instability the Kurds have endured through protracted tyranny, 
violence, and repression.  Ricoeur‟s (1992: 119-121) theory of identity as selfhood (ipse) 
provides a model of the interconnection of events constituted by emplotment allowing an 
integration with permanence in time (idem) what seems to be contrary . . . namely 
variability and discontinuity.    
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    Through narrative idem and ipse identity come together in what Ricouer refers to as the 
“narrative unity of one‟s life.”  In telling a story, the narrator connects disparate events in 
a coherent plot, assigning meaning to events and experiences and creating a new world.  
This act of emplotment draws together the sameness and selfhood of identity in a 
meaningful way.  When a narrator tells a story, he reflects on his history and tradition, 
imagines and anticipates a future, and relates these to his present experience.  This 
threefold dimensionality is explored in Ricoeur‟s mimesis. 
     Ricoeurian Theory of Threefold Mimesis 
     Herda (1999: 76-77) instructs that mimesis refers to three domains: a past, a present 
mediating act, and a future.  Mimesis 1 creates the prefigured life, our traditions, 
assumptions, goals, and motives, whereas mimesis 2 imitates the configured life.  The 
temporal dimension of the configured life, mimesis 2, is a mediating function.  Ricoeur 
(1984: 64-70) explains that mimesis 2 mediates between the world we already have come 
to--already characterized by certain actions and cultural artifacts--and the world we can 
imagine ourselves inhabiting.  As described in Herda (1997a: 62) and applied to 
organizations: 
When we look at the already figured world, the take-for-granted world in mimesis 1 we 
connect this to the new world we want to live in, mimesis 3, we see ourselves in different 
capacities; we see a self enlarged by the appropriation of a proposed world which 
interpretation unfolds.  Here the organizational member (or the reader in literary terms) 
makes his or her own that which was once foreign or alien.  In this act, we have to 
overcome cultural distance and historical alienation that separates us from the proposed 
text-the proposed organization. 
 
     Mimesis1, the prefigured world, or the past-present, is the world of tradition, history, 
and past experiences.  Mimesis2, the configured world, or the present-present consists of 
the way in which people make sense of their world based on their memories of the past 
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and anticipation of the future.  Mimesis3, the refigured world, or the future-present, is 
where we imagine and anticipate a future that is coming towards us, a “kingdom of as if” 
(Ricoeur 1984:  64).  In realizing Ricoeur‟s “kingdom of as if,” Martin Heidegger 
advances that our primordial existentiality of Being is that of Caring. 
Heideggerian Concept of Being as It Relates to Care/Solicitude  
     One of the most important moves made in philosophy was Martin Heidegger‟s linking 
the question of understanding not to another person, as Dilthey did, but to Being (Herda 
1999:60-61).  In Heidegger‟s concept of Being as it relates to care and solicitude he says 
that in such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even 
if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.  In contrast to this, there is 
also the possibility of a kind of solicitude that does not so much leap in for the Other as 
leap ahead of him in his existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 
“care” but rather to give it back to him authentically, as such for the first time.  This kind 
of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care--that is, to the existence of the Other. . . 
it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it 
(1962: 158-159).  Through narration the Kurds may become transparent to themselves 
and free for it on their path of existential potentiality-for-Being.   
Heideggerian Concept of Being as It Relates to Language 
     Herda (1999: 61) writes that Being dwells in language and an individual senses being 
through language.  Heidegger (1971: 5) called “language . . . the house of Being . . . [and] 
. . . man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being.”  The term 
appropriation is used by Heidegger to describe the nature of the relationship between 
person and being.  A person belongs to language and is appropriated by language.  
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Appropriation is the most simple and inconspicuous of phenomena in which mortals 
spend their lives.  Heidegger writes (1971: 128) “. . . appropriation grants to mortals their 
abode within nature, so that they may be capable of being those who speak.”  Further, 
appropriation is a law, but not a law that is an ordinance or a norm hanging over our 
heads telling us what to do, rather it is a “gentle law,” the law, “because it gathers mortals 
into the appropriateness of their nature and there holds them” (1971: 128-129).  
Specifically, (1971: 127) appropriation is “what brings all present and absent beings each 
into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, where they abide 
according to their kind.”   
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality 
      The goal of communication is understanding, a coming to agreement.  Jurgen 
Habermas‟ (1984: xl) framework and foundation for a social theory is in the form of a 
theory of action established through communication; specifically, communicative 
competence.  Communicative competence is a regulative ideal of communication, a guide 
for interaction with others which calls from the future, not from the past.  The starting 
point of the theory is an orientation between a speaker and a hearer to reach mutual 
understanding.  Habermas‟ idea of a speaker and hearer reaching understanding, or 
establishing communicative competence between hearer and speaker, relies on the use of 
reason to attain intersubjective recognition for validity claims that can be criticized.  
Habermas states:   
A communicatively successful speech action requires, beyond the comprehensibility of 
the linguistic expression, that the participants in communication be prepared to reach an 
understanding, that they raise claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness and reciprocally 
impute their satisfaction (1979: 32). 
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     Paul Ricoeur‟s theories provide much of the theoretical foundation for this research.  
Also the works of Clifford Geertz, Martin Heidegger, and Jurgen Habermas are 
grounding to this study. 
Research Categories and Research Questions 
Category I:  Memory 
    Ricoeur (1999) says that both memory and forgetting contribute in their respective 
ways to what Hanah Arendt (1993) calls the “continuation of action.”  For this 
continuation of action it is necessary that we retain the traces of events, be reconciled 
with the past, and divest ourselves of anger and hatred; justice being the horizon of both 
processes.  Ricoeur says the duty to remember is a duty to teach, whereas the duty to 
forget is a duty to go beyond anger and hatred.  Ricoeur urges that we must trust in 
language as a weapon against violence, indeed the best weapon there is against violence 
(1999: 17).   
     The following questions were designed to retain the traces of wounding events in 
order to keep alive the memory of suffering: 
 What is the story of your education? 
 What influence did the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party have on your education?   
 How did Al-Anfal campaign influence your education or your family? 
 
Category II: Promise 
     According to Ricoeur (1999) utopias are the places where we reactivate unkept 
promises.  By “not getting it right” in the past, we look to the future, to a utopia “to get it 
right.”  By remembering the unkept promises of the past and re-projecting them we can 
imagine a better future.  Ricoeur states:  
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Utopian projects, for instance, are about the unkept promises of the historical past being 
re-projected, reanimated in terms of a better future which might realize such lost 
opportunities or unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities.  So here we have to connect past and 
future in an exchange between memory and expectation (1999: 13). 
 
     The following questions were designed to re-project and re-animate the unkept 
promises of the past: 
 How did the Iran-Iraq War influence your education? 
 
 Where were you during the Kurdish uprising of 1991?  
 
 How did the Gulf War (1990-1991) influence your education? 
 
 If you left Kurdistan, please relate why and why you have returned. 
 
Category III:  Imagination 
     A hallmark of leaders is that they know communication or appropriation of the future 
without carrying the “baggage.”  They move through successive interpretations.  Through 
the hermeneutic circle of anticipation, reflection, narrative, conversation, interpretation, 
understanding, and appropriation leaders open possibilities for the future by what is 
remembered and imagined in the present.  The following questions were designed to 
imagine in the present: 
 What influence has the 2003 Iraq War had on education policy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan? 
 What influence have the Iraqi elections of 2005 and the Iraqi constitution of 
October 15, 2005 had on education policy in Iraqi Kurdistan?  
 How would you imagine education policy in the Kurdistan utopia of your 
dreams? 
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The Pilot Study (Fall 2003) 
 
     In spring 2003, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, I was enrolled in the University of San 
Francisco course Legitimation of Power in Society and Organizations.  I remember 
commenting to Dan Mehring, a colleague in the course, that Saddam Hussein had been an 
illegitimate leader for a very long time. At Grace Episcopal Church in March of 2003 our 
priest, Father William McIlmoyl, solicited individual prayers written on paper from the 
congregation   He then read them aloud to help us pray as one body.  Most prayers read 
something like “I pray for peace and that our troops come home safely.”  My prayer read 
a little differently.  I prayed for the “effective dismantling of the Ba‟athist security web in 
Iraq.”  This would be telling of my selecting the Kurds of Iraq as my topic in Advanced 
Anthropological Research in the fall of 2003.   
     By way of the Kurdish Information Network and Kani Zulam, I was referred to a half- 
Kurdish, half- British American, Cyrus S. for his possible participation in my pilot study.  
My hope was to gain historical and political footing on the subject of legitimate Kurdish 
leadership in my conversation with Cyrus. I had been overwhelmed by the deluge of 
literature on the Kurds at the University of California Berkeley library in at least eight 
different languages. My fascinating and informative conversation with Cyrus, over hot 
tea in tall glasses in his Berkeley apartment, wonderfully exceeded my expectations.  In 
many significant ways his words have informed my journey and defined my path.   
     My topic changed in the summer of 2004.  Indepth reading of Ricoeur gave me 
perspective on research and learning which led to my focus on education policy 
development.  The data I chose from the pilot study are different than what I had 
originally planned.  In my conversation with Cyrus he related a traumatic, wounding 
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event his Kurdish cousin experienced when she returned to her home following the 
Kurdish uprising of 1991. He related: 
My cousin lived near a security agency in downtown Sulaymania.  When the uprising 
happened in 1991, the Ba‟ath were four houses away from my cousin‟s house. My cousin 
comes from a very old, genteel, beautiful family; very well educated. The Ba‟ath came 
and told them „You have got to leave.  Don‟t take anything. Just leave.‟  And so they left. 
The uprising happened and they went back. And what happened was the Ba‟ath knew 
they were in trouble so they pretended to be locals.  They moved into my cousin‟s house, 
put on her family‟s clothes and tried to look like they were Kurdish. The Peshmerga 
easily pegged them to be local elite Ba‟athists.  They threw grenades in and the Ba‟athists 
were blown to pieces. When my cousin and her family came home there were body parts 
all over the house.  She hadn‟t told me this for ten years. When you meet people who 
have lived in circumstances like these they can be so matter of fact . . . they‟re like „this is 
normal.‟ 
 
     The research categories Memory, Promise, and Imagination derive from such 
wounding events stored in the collective memory of the Iraqi Kurds. Ricoeur (1999: 9) 
suggests that the “exemplary dimension” of such events is directed towards the future and 
regulated towards justice. And that it is the power of justice by means of which we may 
prevent the same events from recurring in the future. 
Entrée to the Research Site 
     My hope in the fall of 2004 was to find a way to travel to Iraqi Kurdistan.  I attended 
the conference “Kurdish Human Rights: Statelessness, Resistance and Survival” 
September 4
_
5 in San Francisco.  The Social and Cultural Anthropology Program at the 
California Institute of Integral Studies hosted the event.  It was there that I met Ms. Tara 
Aziz.  At that time she was program officer for the Washington Kurdish Institute.  I was 
touched by her presentation and was drawn to her authenticity.  I asked her if I might 
possibly go to Iraqi Kurdistan.  She replied, “Why not?”  I asked her if I could go now 
and she said, “This is the best time to go.”  She asked me to send her my resume and a 
letter of intent as she knew someone in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir of the 
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Kurdistan Regional Government extended me an invitation and three weeks later, on the 
first day of Ramadan October 15, 2004, I arrived at the Chwar Chra Hotel in Erbil, 
Kurdistan, Iraq.  I spent three months there collecting data.   
The Research Participants 
    I returned from Iraqi Kurdistan on January 12, 2005 for spring semester at USF.  Then 
on June 28, 2005 I traveled to Washington, D.C. for further data collection.  I had also 
met Ms. Soraya Serajeddini (passed away on June 24, 2006) at the Kurdish Human 
Rights conference in San Francisco in 2004.  Her presentation “Iraq Drama: Good Shiite-
Bad Shiite, Kurds Lose Again” deeply interested me.  She was very active in Kurdish 
politics and was residing in the metropolitan Washington area. Also in the D.C. area was 
Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, who I had met at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil while recording Dr. 
Mohammad Ihsan.  In Washington, D.C. I attended two conferences; the Kurdish 
National Congress of North America‟s “Kurdish Quest for Independence and Prospects 
for Statehood” March 17-19, 2006 at the D.C. North Hilton and the Kurdish American 
Committee for Democracy in Iran‟s “Road to Democracy---Full Political and Human 
Rights in Iran” at the Russell Senate Office Building May 30, 2006. At these two events I 
met Mr. Qubad Talabany, Dr. Kamal Artin, Mr. Tom Ver Ploeg, and Dr. Pary Karadaghi.  
I recorded Ms. Soraya Serajeddini on June 11, 2006 in College Park, Maryland.  I spoke 
with Mr. Nijyar Shemdin in his office in McLean, Virginia on August 28, 2006.  Dr. Pary 
Karadaghi I recorded in her Fairfax, Virginia office on April 4, 2007 and Mr. Qubad 
Talabany in his office in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2007.  The remaining eight 
participants were recorded in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq in late 2004 and early 2005. All 
twelve participants have bachelor‟s degree; three have master‟s degrees and seven have 
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doctorates. The following chart gives a brief profile of the research participants (See 
Appendix E pages 130-134 for photographs). 
      Name                                        Title                                     Organization 
 
Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir   Minister of State (original)    Kurdistan Regional Government 
Born: 1964 in Erbil,               
Kurdistan, Iraq                      Director of Foreign  
                                              Relations (current) 
 
Mr. Safeen Dizayee             Director of External           Kurdistan Democratic Party 
Born: 1963 in Erbil,              Relations 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
 
Dr. Susan Hussain               Professor                            University of Salahaddin  
Born: 1965 in Erbil, 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
 
Dr. Mohammad Ihsan       Minister of Human Rights   Kurdistan Regional Government  
Born: 1965 in Zakho,           (original) 
Kurdistan, Iraq                     Minister of External Affairs (current) 
                                                  
Dr. Pary Karadaghi           Director                                Kurdish Human Rights Watch 
Born:  1959 in Sulaymania, 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
 
Dr. Kafia Mawloud           Dean of Nursing College      University of Salahaddin 
Born: 1954 in Erbil, 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
Dr. Narin Mayiwar           Professor                                University of Salahaddin 
Born: 1971 in Aqra, 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
 
Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz             Minister of Humanitarian      Kurdistan Regional Government 
Born: 1934 in Sulaymania, Aid and Cooperation (original) 
Kurdistan, Iraq                    Retired (current) 
 
Dr. Mohammad Sadik       President                               University of Salahaddin 
Born: 1955 near Erbil, 
Kurdistan, Iraq 
 
Ms. Soraya Serajeddini     Vice President                      Kurdish National Congress of  
Born: 1960 in Tehran, Iran                                                         North America 
Died: July 24, 2006 in the USA 
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Mr. Nijyar H. Shemdin     Representative to the           Kurdistan Regional Government 
Born: 1938 in Zakho,          UN/USA/Canada (original) 
Kurdistan, Iraq                    CEO (current)                                         Middle East Corporation for     
                                                                                          Reconstruction and Investment 
 
Mr. Qubad Talabany        Representative to the            Kurdistan Regional Government 
Born: 1977 in exile in         USA         
the Middle East  
The Data Collection Process 
   The data were collected through conversations that were recorded and transcribed.  The 
transcribing, typing, and editing of the conversations were completed from July 2006 to 
July 2007. As the texts became available, they were sent via email to the participants for 
their approval. Mr. Tom Ver Ploeg and Dr. Kamal Artin read and commented on the 
transcription of the conversation with the late Ms. Soraya Serajeddini (See Appendices 
A-D on pages 124-129 for IRBPHS forms).  
The Data Analysis Process 
     Ricoeur (1982: 53) stresses in the non-ostensive act of analysis that the text “must be 
unfolded, no longer towards its author, but towards its imminent sense and towards the 
world which it opens up and discloses.”  The conversations generated two hundred and 
fifty five pages of data.  The original categories of Memory, Promise, and Imagination 
were maintained. The data and an initial analysis are presented in Chapters Five, Six, and 
Seven. The problem is discussed at the theoretical level in Chapter Eight. Implications of 
the research and suggestions for further study are made in Chapter Nine.  Examples of the 
learning experience and “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer 1976: xxi) are also offered along 
with how the study is related to me and what role it played in my life. 
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Background of the Researcher 
      Herda (1999: 9) states that “Critical hermeneutic participatory research is not 
described as a revolutionary position; rather it is a position to which one is summoned.”  I 
was summoned to this particular project by my experience with the Syrian Ba‟ath Party.  
When I was teaching English as a Foreign Language for the United States Information 
Agency in Damascus, Syria, 1987 to1989, a student of mine, Al-Khayam Al-Hemsch, 
was imprisoned for three hundred and seventy two days by the Syrian Ba‟ath for having 
had a friendship with me, an American.  I was interrogated twice by Syrian intelligence 
liaisons, once in the infamous Mazzeh prison.  I was refused a travel visa to Turkey.  Al-
Khayam was tortured and remained in prison until two days after I left the country.  I 
have personal, first hand experience with the tyranny of the Syrian Ba‟ath Party.  The 
horizon of this study is justice, however, not revenge.   
     As part of my undergraduate work in Spanish and Latin American Studies at The 
Evergreen State College 1974-1979, I completed a three month ethnographic study of the 
Zapotec Indians of Teotitlan del Valle, Mexico. I also worked as a Health and Nutrition 
Educator in integrated rural development as a United States Peace Corps Volunteer in 
Longavi, Chile from 1980-1982.  I earned my master‟s degree in College Instruction with 
an interdisciplinary emphasis in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages in 
1987.  As part of my twelve year work in TESOL I was project coordinator for a United 
States Information Agency College and University Partnership Program grant between 
the University of Maryland and Samara State Pedagogical University in Samara, Russia. I 
spent fall semester 1994 and fall semester 1995 at Samara State Pedagogical University 
collaboratively writing an English language teaching text book for Russian university 
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students.  I also worked for the United States Department of Commerce as a bilingual 
supervisor for Census 2000.  
Summary 
     This chapter addresses the research process carried out within the critical hermeneutic 
tradition.  It provides the Theoretical Framework for the Project, The Research 
Categories and Research Questions, The Pilot Study, The Entrée to the Research Site, 
The Research Participants, The Data Collection Process, The Data Analysis Process, and 
the Background of the Researcher.  It offers that through narrative and conversation the 
researcher learned of the wounding events that scar the collective memory of the Kurds 
and that through analysis hopes to “leap ahead of the Other in his existential potentiality-
for-being . . . and give his care back to him authentically as such for the first time” 
(Heidegger 1962).  Chapter Five presents the data within the category of Memory and an 
initial analysis. 
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CHAPTER V 
MEMORY 
 
The soul empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being  
it is looking at, just as he is, in all his truth-Simone Weil (Noddings 1992: 15-16). 
 
Introduction 
     The previous chapter of this document introduces the theoretical framework for the 
study, the research participants, and provides the guiding questions and research 
categories for the conversations. This chapter presents the narrative the data depicts 
within the category of Memory.  The data presentation includes the subsections 
Memories of the Iraqi Ba‟ath and Education; Only Those Who Signed for the Ba‟ath 
Were Privileged and Promoted, and Wounding Events; Arabization and the Anfal 
Campaign.  A summary concludes the chapter. 
     The central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education?” answered in 
light of the rule of the Iraqi Ba‟ath, divided the participants into three sets. The first set, 
Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz and Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, did not attend school or university under the 
rule of the Iraqi Ba‟ath. During the reign of the monarchy they both attended Baghdad 
College, an American Jesuit preparatory high school affiliated with Boston College.  Dr. 
Qazzaz received his B.A. in Economics from the University of Baghdad in 1960, his 
M.A. in Diplomacy and International Economics from the University of Kentucky and in 
1971 received his Ph.D. in International Studies from American University.  From 1965 
to 1973 he was the representative of Mullah Mustafa Barzani‟s September Revolution in 
the United States.  Mr. Nijyar Shemdin graduated from Baghdad College, the Jesuit high 
school, in 1955.   At the end of 1955 he went to Roberts College in Istanbul and studied 
there for three years until 1958.  Abd al-Karim Qasim‟s coup de’ etat in Iraq in 1958 
interrupted Mr. Shemdin‟s education.  In 1964 he graduated from the Jesuit university in 
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Baghdad, Al-Hikma, with a BAC in Business Administration. He later received his MBA 
from the American University of Beirut. 
     The second set of research participants were either born in exile or were primarily 
educated in Diaspora.  Their stories mostly appear in the category of Promise. They 
include Mr. Safeen Dizayee, Dr. Pary Karadaghi, Ms. Narin Mayiwar, Ms. Soraya 
Serajeddini, and Mr. Qubad Talabany.   
     The third set of research participants attended school, university, or taught during the 
rule of the Ba‟ath Party in Iraq. They include Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, Dr. Susan 
Hussain, Dr. Mohammad Ihsan, Dr. Kafia Mawloud, and Dr. Mohammad Sadik. 
Memories of the Iraqi Ba’ath and Education  
 
     In Time and Narrative v 3, Paul Ricoeur (1988: 109-113) speaks of the succession of 
generations and believes that predecessors, contemporaries, and successors provide an 
answer by designating the chain of historical agents as living people who come to take 
the place of dead people. This succession underlies historical continuity and the rhythm 
of tradition and innovation.  Ricoeur says that the “very relation of contemporaneity” is a 
mediating structure between the private time of individual fate and the public time of 
history. The following is the story of my research, the narrative of the conversations I 
had, in which I learned of the wounding events that scar the collective memory of the 
Iraqi Kurd. All the conversations were in English. At times I correct grammar or syntax 
for clarification, yet primarily use the words of the participants. 
       I had been in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq for three weeks when I visited the office of Mr. 
Falah Mustafa Bakir as Minister of State, Office of the Prime Minister, for the Kurdistan 
Regional Government.  It being Ramadan, his assistant, Ms. Souham Mamand, gracefully 
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wore a dark gold head scarf which complemented her modern, tailored Western clothing. 
She greeted me warmly and was surprised I had been in Erbil for so long. Hers was the 
first memory I heard of the influence the Iraqi Ba‟ath had on Kurdish education. She told 
me how the Ba‟ath Party had come to her school when she was in the sixth grade and 
asked her to report unfavorably on her neighbors.  She refused their request.  They said, 
“Well, then we will take your father.”  They imprisoned her father several times and 
subsequently she wasn‟t allowed to graduate from the sixth grade.  I tried to imagine this 
happening at my elementary school, River Road Elementary, in Eugene, Oregon in the 
mid 1960s.  It was impossible to imagine.  I felt deep shame as an American and as a 
human being that no one had stepped in to shield and protect the education of this 
innocent girl. I was assured that traveling to Iraqi Kurdistan, to listen to the story of the 
Iraqi Kurd, was of vital importance.  When I spoke with Dr. Susan Hussain, professor of 
French and English Literature at the University of Salahaddin, she said she thought that 
each Kurdish family had such “a miserable and tragic story.”   
Only Those Who Signed for the Ba’ath Were Privileged and Promoted 
     I spoke with Dr. Hussain in my suite at the Chwar Chra Hotel in Erbil. The name 
“Chwar Chra” or “four lamps” holds special significance for the Kurds. In Kurdistan 
Iran, following the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, General Mustafa 
Barzani and the Peshmerga captured President Qadi Mohammad. Mohammad, along with 
four others, was hung at the intersection where four roads meet named “Chwar Chra.”  
This intersection has become a symbol of the Kurdish struggle for independence.  Two of 
Dr. Susan Hussain‟s brothers were also Peshmerga. She recalls, as the youngest at home, 
that although her older brothers and sisters were very intelligent “it was only those who 
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signed for the Ba‟ath Party who were privileged and promoted.”  She said, “This was the 
beginning, I saw that there was injustice. Later it became even worse.”   
     There was a Kurdish student in Dr. Hussain‟s class who had signed for the Ba‟ath in 
order to protect her family.  Her father was in prison. Dr. Hussain commented, “It was 
their, let‟s say, „rule.‟ Someone in a family did something and then all the others were 
condemned.  Whole families would disappear, even little children.  This was their 
policy.”  In the same class they were obligated to elect a student to represent the Party.  
The day of the election Dr. Hussain decided not to vote and submitted a blank ballot. She 
said, “It was a disaster later on.”  After the election she was called into the office of the 
headmaster. He asked “Do you know what you are doing?”  She wondered how they 
knew she hadn‟t voted.  It was supposed to be a secret ballot.  They began to threaten her 
saying that she and her family were going to be punished.  She said, “After that I was the 
black sheep at school.  Although I was the best student, little by little they began to 
punish me by my marks.  You know, giving me low marks and so on.” The giving of low 
marks to Kurdish students who excelled, but who wouldn‟t join the Party, was the norm 
under the Iraqi Ba‟ath.  Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir was also punished during his years at 
the University of Mosul for being Kurdish and for not joining the Party. 
        I first saw Mr. Falah Mustafa, now Director of the Office of Foreign Relations for 
the Kurdistan Regional Government, on television in the lobby of the Chwar Chra Hotel.  
He was being broadcast on the Kurdish network from in front of the Whitehouse in 
Washington, D.C. When I spoke with him later in his Erbil office he told me about 
several points in his education where the Ba‟ath had prevented him from progressing. In 
his secondary school the Ba‟ath came and imposed on people that they become Party 
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members. He said that he managed to avoid the Ba‟ath until he went to the university.  
He was admitted in 1982 to the University of Mosul, College of Arts; English Language 
Department. He related a story to me. One day in the afternoon, after office hours, he was 
wearing a Kurdish outfit. He and some friends had been picnicking and had come back. 
They were sitting in the garden of the university.  A Ba‟ath security agent approached 
them. Mr. Falah thought the Muhabarat liked the Kurdish dress he wore and thought that 
the agent wanted to take a photograph with him. Instead, the Ba‟ath asked for his I.D. in a 
very impolite way. Mr. Falah said the Ba‟ath were “never polite in dealing with people.” 
That in the security checkpoints and everywhere in the university they spoke “in a very 
tough, rude language.” He said, “The Ba‟ath were arrogant and felt that they were 
superior to others. This gave me a feeling of inferiority.” 
     Mr. Falah took out his I.D. and gave it to the Muhabarat.  It was university student 
I.D. The Muhabarat said, “You are not allowed to wear this.”  Mr. Falah replied, “Well, I 
am not in the class and this is normal and everybody wears it.”  I asked Mr. Falah if it 
was a rule that Kurdish dress was not allowed. He replied, “No, it was just what was in 
his thoughts.  It was arbitrary, based on his temperament.”  He went on to say that the 
Ba‟ath security agent had the power to arrest him, that he was authorized to do anything, 
and that “this was the security and the Muhabarat in the regime of the Ba‟ath.” 
      Mr. Falah‟s dream was to become a successful English language teacher. He had 
Indian and Pakistani lecturers in the first and second year of the university.  One lecturer 
he described as being “very honest and faithful.”  This particular lecturer told Mr. Falah 
that they [the teachers] had to give him lower marks, even though he was doing very 
well. The lecturer said that they had to give him marks lower than the two ladies who 
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were Iraqi Ba‟ath Party officers‟ daughters.  The following is an excerpt from the 
conversation: 
FMB: He said he could give me lower marks, but he could not give me higher marks.  
Even though I was doing very well in the exams, in class participation, and in everything, 
they were not able to give me more.  The exception was the course in Arab Ba‟ath Party 
ideology; the national education about Saddam and his Party.  In that course, on that 
subject, they gave me the lowest marks that I had.  In the rest, I had excellent or very 
good.  The least mark that I had was very good.  But they gave me medium or average, or 
just pass. 
JJ:  So what you are saying is they couldn‟t give you as high as what you had really 
earned . . . 
FMB:  They were told.  The teaching staff was told that they should not give me higher 
marks than these two ladies [Ba‟ath Party officers‟ daughters]. 
JJ:  So, no matter what you did . . . 
FMB:  So, no matter what I wrote . . . 
JJ:  It [your grade] always had to be lower . . . 
FMB: Indeed I had cases, for example, in the first semester, when I had thirty seven out 
of forty in drama.  That was the highest mark in the class.  The teacher told me, in a very 
rude way, „If you don‟t take care of yourself, you will fail.‟   
JJ:  If you don‟t take care of yourself you will fail? 
FMB:  Yes. 
JJ:  You mean if you don‟t start doing poorly . . . if you don‟t watch it you are going to 
fail? 
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FMB:  Yes.   
     This was very unfair.  I thought about my values in education and how angry I would 
be with such treatment. Mr. Falah said the teacher was a Ba‟ath Party member, a high 
ranking official.  That he was unable to speak English and that he did not write his own 
dissertation. That he had paid someone to write it for him. Mr. Falah noted, “His name 
was Azhat.  He was incapable.  He was immoral.  He was impolite and he talked in 
Arabic, the Muslari dialect, in class.”   
      The most unfortunate, according to Mr. Falah, was when he reached the final stage of 
the fourth year in the university.  It was during the Iran-Iraq War.  He remembers they 
had a Christian lecturer.  The lecturer approached him and said, “Look Falah, I need your 
benefit.  I need your future.  You are a very good student.  You are very clever.  Come 
and join the Ba‟ath Party.”  Mr. Falah said that the Ba‟ath would come every week and 
ask him to join.  He said that they wanted to get the top students in the class; that they 
wanted to attract the best people to be Ba‟ath Party members.  The Christian lecturer told 
Mr. Falah: 
Look, Falah, it will be for your benefit if you join.  If you sign for the Ba‟ath Party, then 
you will not be sent to the front. You will not serve in the army for five or six years.  You 
will just go there for six months and then you will come and join your studies. Your heart 
will not be with them.  But it will be for your benefit. 
 
     He told the Christian lecturer, “Even if I go to Erbil, to Sheik Halawi, and sell 
cucumbers and tomatoes with my degree in my pocket, I will not join the Ba‟ath Party.”   
He later did join the army in hopes of pursuing a graduate degree.  His average during his 
studies in English Language and Literature from the University of Mosul was 82.61%. 
But when he submitted his papers he did not meet the requirements.  The requirements 
were to be a Ba‟ath Party member . . . to have donated jewelry for Saddam‟s codicil . . . 
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to have followed Saddam‟s ideology . . . He told me, “I will never, ever forget that.  I felt 
nothing was right in this country. Everything was based on unfairness and injustice.” 
Then he said to me, “Indeed I am very proud and very fortunate that I was able to 
continue and to take up the challenge until 1994, when I was able to get my master‟s 
degree in the UK.”  The Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership supported him to apply 
for an achievement scholarship.  He received his master‟s degree from the University of 
Bath in Development Studies with a focus on the Third World.  His thesis was on the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq and world politics.  “Taking up the challenge” in Mr. Falah 
Mustafa Bakir‟ words, is reminiscent of a knight taking up the gauntlet for a noble cause. 
This serves as a metaphor for the Kurdish struggle to receive a just education under the 
Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. 
Wounding Events 
     Dr. Susan Hussain was also a top student at the University of Mosul. In her second 
year, during the war against Iran, she and a group of Kurdish students protested fighting 
as Jaysheshabee.  Jaysheshabee was supposed to be a volunteer civilian army, but the 
students were forced to join. The protest was during the examinations at the end of the 
year. Because they protested, they lost the whole year and had to repeat it.  Dr. 
Mohammad Ihsan was with her in the same group.  He had told me about the Muhabarat 
coming to an examination at the University of Mosul and taking students away.  The 
students disappeared and were never heard from again.  Dr. Hussain clarified that that 
incident was in the first year, but that the protest was in the second year.  An excerpt from 
the conversation with her follows: 
That examination was a different one. That was in the first year.  The protest was in the 
2
nd
 year.  It continued like this, the same scenario every year of forcing us, especially for 
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those who were not with the Ba‟ath.  All the time there was oppression; giving us low 
marks because we were Kurdish, punishing us because we wouldn‟t join the Ba‟ath. 
When I graduated in 1988 in English Literature I wanted to teach.  It was my dream to be 
a teacher like my father.  But the Executive Ministry, the branch of Saddam‟s Ba‟ath here 
in Erbil, told me that I had to sign.  That I had to promise I was going to serve Saddam 
and his Party otherwise I wasn‟t going to be accepted for a job.  They told me, „If you 
want to work, you have to pledge allegiance to the Ba'ath Party.‟  
 
      Dr. Hussain eventually got a job doing translation, but the aftermath of the Kurdish 
uprising during the Gulf War was an event that would change her life forever. She said to 
me “It hurts when I think about it . . . something prevents me from talking about it.  It is 
still inside of me . . .” I asked her if it was too deep.  She said, “Yes. I still haven‟t talked 
about it.  I wish I could tell you everything that happened, but it is too deep . . .” But she 
did continue.  Nothing had prepared me for what I was about to hear.  I knew that 
Saddam Hussein‟s regime had brutally repressed the Kurdish uprising in March of 1991, 
but what exactly did that mean?  Research in the hermeneutic tradition (Herda 1999: 44) 
is an interpretive personal and moral endeavor.  In the fall of 2003 when I first came 
across Susan Meiselas work in forensic anthropological photography on the Kurds; the 
mass graves, I questioned whether I was capable of researching such a topic.  Now, I 
believe as Mr. Qubad Talabany does when he says, “It should be our moral obligation as 
Americans to listen to the story of the Kurds and to help rectify the injustices.”   
     Dr. Hussain talked about visiting the prisons when they were opened during the first 
three weeks of the uprising. She recalls: 
During the period when we were free we went to the prisons.  I saw with my own eyes an 
identity card from one of the Ba'ath Party officers, those who were the guards in the 
prison.  His name was written, then his date of birth, and then for his profession it said 
“aggressor.” It was written “al muwatedi” in Arabic.  I translated it as “aggressor.” 
Someone who aggresses someone else.  It is a profession.  It is a job.  Imagine someone 
who would accept a job like that… 
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     She continued by telling me how she and other Kurdish women were forced to return 
to Erbil after Saddam had taken the city, as not to stay exposed, out in the open, because 
of their children.  Just before they entered the city of Erbil they were stopped. She said it 
was terrible because they took all their men.  Her mother and others began to cry, “Please 
let them go.  What are you doing?  No, no, no, please…”  One of the soldiers came over.  
Dr. Hussain and her mother said, “Please have a little pity on us. You may also have a 
family.” The soldier was a Shiite from the south.  He told them, “You know, I‟ll tell you 
something, I with my own hands killed my family because I was ordered to do so. Do 
you think I am going to let you go?”  
     I was astounded to hear this story.  I likened it to the Nazis and the Hitler regime.  Dr. 
Hussain agreed with me.  She said: 
I don‟t know what was going on in his head. There was something that they did to their 
minds.  And someone who kills his own family . . .  He said, „Saddam told us that they 
were traitors and that they didn‟t deserve to live, so I killed them. They had to submit to 
Saddam.‟    
   
    This was particularly wounding, yet really horrifying was that Dr. Susan Hussain 
witnessed, with her parents and siblings, Saddam‟s men kill her sister in their home.  The 
following is an excerpt from the conversation: 
SH:  But, of course, I lost a sister here because, during the bombing, she was killed by 
one of the soldiers.  She had an M.A. in Biology.  She had a fiancé; she wasn‟t even 
thirty years old. When I say this period, it was with the uprising when we came back; 
actually, just before they left they did this damning thing.  Then they left.  It was the last 
thing they did.  We were about to say „we are free‟ but unfortunately… 
JJ:  They wanted to leave a scar… 
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SH:  They left a kind of wound inside of all of us and they did it in front of all of our 
eyes…especially in our home.  There is something very heavy inside me.  I'd like to tell 
you though.  I didn‟t even cry.  I was shocked…not believing actually what had happened 
and her place at home and everything.  Somehow we were lost.  We were lost, each one 
of us.  As a solution my father suggested that I go abroad and study.   
     Dr. Susan Hussain thought her life was over. For one year she felt lost and completely 
disoriented.  She eventually did go abroad to study.  She completed her M.A. and Ph.D. 
in France and came back to teach at the University of Salahaddin.  This event was 
horrific, yet to “extract the exemplarity,” Dr. Hussain feels she has a “duty to tell” and a 
“duty to teach” future generations so the same thing will never happen again.      
Arabization and the Anfal Campaign 
 
     I first heard Mr. Qubad Talabany speak at the 18
th
 Annual Kurdish National Congress 
of North America conference in Gaithersburg, Maryland in March of 2006.  About two 
hundred men attended the conference, including journalist Christopher Hitchens. I was 
one of approximately ten women in attendance, possibly five of whom were American. 
Mr. Talabany‟s forthright statement that the Kurds must “prepare for the failed state of 
Iraq” captured my attention.  Following the unification of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in May of 2006, Mr. Talabany became the KRG representative in 
Washington, D.C.  As stated in Chapter Four, I recorded him on April 13, 2007 in his 
D.C. office.  I began our conversation by speaking about something I had seen on the 
news a day earlier that had surprised me.  An American journalist was at Baghdad 
University in a classroom.  They were comparing the Iraq War to the Vietnam War.  She 
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was saying something about whether you were Kurd, Shiite or Sunni.  And I wondered if 
there were any Kurds in Baghdad University classrooms.  Mr. Talabany responded: 
Barring a census, we will never really know, but there are over half a million Kurds 
living in Baghdad. There are those who have been there forever.  Some would even say 
the number is closer to a million.  You know, again, you can only speculate.  Only when 
we get a census will we realize how many Kurds actually live in Baghdad.  But I am sure 
there are Kurds in universities in Baghdad.  I am sure of it.  Whether they have the same 
level of patriotism to Kurdistan is also up in the air . . . 
 
     This brought up the very important topic of the referendum in Kirkuk; the 
implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.  I inquired if the census pertained 
to other parts of the country.  He responded:  
The whole country needs a census, whether we are talking about Kirkuk or the 
distribution of oil revenues.  We are trying to distribute the country‟s oil revenues on a 
per capita basis, but we can‟t do that unless we have a census.  So the country is 
desperate for a census.  Because at the moment we have Kurds saying we are six to seven 
million.  We have Turcoman saying they are two to three million.  We have Shiite saying 
they have got I don‟t know how many million.  If you add up what everyone is saying, 
the population of Iraq is nearer fifty million rather than the thirty million that it actually 
is.  So let‟s get a census.  Let‟s settle this once and for all and find out who is where and 
what and why.   
 
     I was curious about the mass graves and whether that population would figure into a 
census.  I told him that I thought some of the problem, if I wasn‟t mistaken, was that 
many of those people have not ever officially been considered dead. He responded by 
saying that many of them were not registered.  That they never received death 
certificates. He said, “There are women who don‟t know where their husbands are.  They 
can‟t remarry; they can‟t move on; they are stuck in a horrible limbo, waiting for 
someone to give them confirmation of their deceased husband.”  He continued, “It is not 
only a problem in terms of statistics, but it is a real social and psychological problem that 
is affecting Kurdish society in many different ways.” I wondered if, legally, the Anfal 
trials had any correlation to those missing persons. Also at that moment, I was grateful 
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that Mr. Talabany had been born and raised in exile. That he had studied in England and 
had been protected by his father and grandfather.  He responded to my question about the 
Anfal victims by saying: 
The Anfal trials are ongoing even though Saddam has been executed. It is critical that 
they continue.  It is critical that the crimes Saddam committed against all the people of 
Iraq, in particular the Kurds, be documented.  Just because he has been executed doesn‟t 
mean that we have to take our „foot off the pedal.‟  His crimes must be documented. They 
need to be registered.  They need to be ratified by the international community.  The 
international community needs to say „yes‟ genocide took place.  Halabja was genocide.  
The draining of the marshes in the south was genocide.  It must not go down in history 
that Saddam was executed for killing only a hundred and forty eight people.  He killed 
millions of people.  Everyone reserves the right to be recognized in this way.   
 
     I was curious about what would happen if determined that it was indeed genocide.  I 
meant legally, beyond executing the guilty.  Without even pausing he told me, “This is 
about recognition of the suffering of the Kurdish people, an international recognition of 
the suffering of the Kurds.  This will give the international community a second chance at 
condemning what happened. They mainly, by and large, with the exception of a few 
noble countries, remained silent.”  He continued by saying, “This will be an 
acknowledgment of the atrocities we faced.  We can never really heal the pain.  We will 
never really bring the loved ones back.  But it will be closure.  To say that justice was 
finally served.”  I told him that justice is the horizon of this dissertation; a narrative, each 
person being able to talk about his or her case.  He responded by saying “There needs to 
be a large scale national reconciliation process if there is to be an Iraq, if Iraq is to exist 
as a state.” He continued, “The Kurds are fearful, insecure and skeptical of Iraq today 
because of the atrocities that befell them.”       
     Mr. Talabany believes that Kirkuk is a critical component of national reconciliation.  
That the Kurds can‟t move on unless the injustices committed against them in Kirkuk are 
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rectified.  For healing to begin, he said that those Kurds who were forcibly evicted from 
their homes need to be given the right to return to their homes; the right to determine 
their own destiny.  The Kurds feel that genocide was carried out against them and that the 
world is moving on without having recognized the suffering.  He stated, “The referendum 
is an opportunity to rectify an injustice, which is why this process of resettlement is 
critical.”  He continued by saying: 
We have Saddam and his henchmen in the docks for the crimes they committed against 
the people of the country, for the crimes of genocide.  Saddam has been executed.  One 
by one his henchmen are being executed for these crimes.  But we are leaving their racist 
handiwork intact.  Few times in life do we get to reverse a crime; few times in life.  And 
here is an opportunity where we can rectify this.  Yes, here we have an opportunity to 
rectify an injustice.  But for one reason or another there are people who are turning a 
blind eye to this . . . 
 
     Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli (2004) in an article entitled “Truth and Reconciliation” states: 
It is not the business of the Kurds to sort out the 1,500 year long conflict between the 
Shias and the Sunnis.  They are both Arabs and neither had any problem in participating 
in Anfal as part of Saddam‟s army and security forces.  They will sooner or later resolve 
their differences, but Kurdistan should not be offered as a scapegoat for any Iraqi  
purpose . . . Why consecrate the soil and soul of Kurdistan with Arab fascists, Ba‟athists 
and Anfalists who have never believed that the Kurds deserve life and liberty? 
 
     In a September 18, 2008 Washington Post article entitled “The Kurds Vision of Iraq” 
Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir responds to a September 13, 2008 Post article “Strip of Iraq on 
the Verge of Exploding.”  In his response he states: 
The Kurdistan Regional Government and its Peshmerga forces are not seeking control of 
the city of Khanaqin.  More than 90% of the residents of Khanaqin are Kurdish and the 
city was peaceful until Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent Iraqi military forces 
there last month in an unwelcome and unnecessary provocation that sparked 
demonstrations by tens of thousands of residents.  This aggressive act caught the 
Kurdistan regional leadership by surprise, given that it occurred around the time that the 
KRG and other Iraqi parties had nearly reached agreement on a provincial election law; a 
key Iraqi benchmark.  Since then, the election law has stalled, and the KRG has 
negotiated with Baghdad for the re-deployment of some Kurdish Peshmerga forces.  The 
KRG is fully committed to a peaceful, democratic, federal Iraq, but we reject such 
intimidation from the prime minister.  Furthermore, we are becoming alarmed at the 
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increasingly threatening nationalist rhetoric that some Iraqi Arab parties have directed at 
the Kurds, which brings back memories of previous Iraqi government approaches. All 
concerned parties, including U.S. and U.N. negotiators, should respect the Iraqi 
constitutional process.  There has been political progress in Iraq, but it is fragile.  The 
Kurds of Iraq have made vital contributions to Iraq‟s progress and will continue to do so.  
Undermining the constitution on the status of Kirkuk, one of the most contentious issues 
in Iraq, will only weaken Iraq‟s delicate political compact, which Americans and Kurds 
have worked hard to achieve. 
 
     
The Department of Arabization 
     I recorded Ms. Soraya Serajeddini on June 11, 2006 in College Park, Maryland.  She 
talked about the arrogance of the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party in actually having a “Department of 
Arabization.”  She left Tehran in 1979 in the wake of the Islamic Revolution. The 
Ayatollah Khomeini‟s revolution had promised autonomy to the Kurds of Iran, but that 
didn‟t happen.  She and her brother escaped Tehran disguised as peasants.  They hid 
during the day and walked at night. Soraya then traveled by mule through the mountains 
to Iraqi Kurdistan where she had relatives. Eventually she made her way to Baghdad, 
although she had never planned to stay in Iraq. She was Naqshbandi.  The Iraqis had 
made many promises to the Naqshbandi family. They had said, “If you come to Iraq, we 
will not stop your children from leaving.” She told me there was a program to help 
foreign students but that there was a caveat.  Soraya‟s father, Mr. Abed Serajeddini, had 
published many writings against the Ba‟ath Party.  He had to stay and teach at the 
University of Baghdad.  She walked with him daily to the university.  One day as they 
were walking to the campus he said, “Oh my dear let‟s walk on the other side of the street 
because if you walk under that building you will become an Arab.”  She looked over.  
They actually had a “Department of Arabization.”  She said, “I was in danger of being 
Arabized.  That atmosphere was awful.  He was depressed.  He said he couldn‟t stand it 
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there.  That he couldn‟t teach there.  That there was no way that he was staying.  That he 
didn‟t care by what means or what pretense or whatever.  He wanted to get me out of 
there.”  She was finally able to leave Baghdad.  She went to San Francisco as she had a 
cousin there and studied at San Francisco State University. 
     I tried to imagine the “Department of Arabization.”  I wondered, specifically, what 
they would do.  Soraya said the translation was closer to the “Arabized.” She said, “It 
was like something out of two centuries ago; the 1800s” and that it “was amazing for us 
to see that in such an obvious, arrogant, and just disgusting way you would talk about 
changing people from one, not only culture, but from one race to another.”  She said, “It 
is still institutionalized; if you look at Syria and the situation there.  In an environment 
like that it is very hard, almost impossible, to teach.”     
Summary 
     This chapter presents the narrative within the category of Memory.  The data tell of 
how the collective identity and memory of the Kurdish nation is scarred by wounding 
events of Ba‟ath Party injustice and unfairness in schools and universities. They reveal 
how the atrocities of Arabization and the Anfal campaign have left a legacy of injustice 
that has not been rectified by the execution of Saddam Hussein. The data also speak of 
how Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and some Iraqi Arab parties are currently 
undermining the constitutional process to reverse the policy of Arabization in Kirkuk and 
other disputed areas.  Chapter Six presents the data within the category of Promise. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROMISE 
 
Introduction 
     The previous chapter of this document presents the narrative within the category of 
Memory.  This chapter presents the narrative of the data within the category of Promise.  
It offers how broken promises of the Iraqi Ba‟ath; the unraveling of the 1970 autonomy 
agreement and  the violent wake of the 1991 Kurdish uprising with concomitant exile and 
flees into Diaspora, have influenced the education of the Iraqi Kurd. The chapter includes 
the subsections:  The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse; Exile and Diaspora, and The 
Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising.  A summary concludes the chapter. 
The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse 
     I spoke with Dr. Pary Karadaghi, Director of Kurdish Human Rights Watch, in her 
office in Fairfax, Virginia on April 4, 2007. Her father, Mr. Mustafa Karadaghi, was a 
primary figure in the Kurdistan revolution. Our conversation began with a discussion of 
language.  Dr. Karadaghi had spoken Kurdish at home growing up in Sulaymania. When 
the 1970 peace accord was signed and in place her father returned to his diplomatic post 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad.  They moved to Baghdad and she was then 
required to study in Arabic.  She didn‟t speak any Arabic.  As a solution to the problem, 
Dr. Karadaghi‟s parents asked her teacher to write their daughter‟s homework 
assignments down in a notebook so they could help her at home. One day the teacher 
didn‟t write the assignment down. The next day the teacher, in front of all the other 
students, took a ruler and started beating Dr. Karadaghi‟s hands because her homework 
was not finished. She was new to the classroom.  She was being beaten and her knuckles 
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were bleeding.  Dr. Karadaghi was eight when this happened.  I asked her how she had 
coped. She responded by saying: 
There were many things in my life from then on that were unfair; a lack of justice.  In 
Iraq corporal punishment was allowed. If you talk to professors of universities who were 
teaching during the Ba'ath Party time they will tell you Ba'ath students would come in 
and humiliate the professor.  They would beat the professor in front of the other students. 
Then the Muhabarat would drag this poor professor to prison because he had refused to 
pass Ba'ath students.   
 
     Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir had told me about “donating” jewelry for Saddam‟s codicil. I 
asked her about this.  She said, “Oh, definitely.  At one point Saddam, whose faucets 
were made of gold, issued a statement that it was more „modest‟ not to have so much 
gold.” She continued, “He suggested that everyone should come and contribute their gold 
to the Ba'ath Party.  People lined up.  They were afraid if they didn‟t turn in their gold 
there would be consequences. This was during the Iran–Iraq war and Saddam was 
running low on hard currency.”  She explained, “He needed gold to balance the Iraqi 
dinar.  At that time the Iraqi dinar was very strong.  One Iraqi dinar was three and a half 
dollars. People would give their gold, their land; the Ba'ath would confiscate anything 
that was precious in Iraq.”  She emphasized, “This was a government that ruled by fear.  
The Ba'ath Party was so strong that even in Europe they were a threat.”  
Exile and Diaspora 
     As previously stated, after the March 1974 Ba‟ath attempt to assassinate General 
Barzani and his son Idris, full scale fighting broke out.  This forced many Kurds, 
especially those closely linked to Kurdish politics, into exile and Diaspora.  I met with 
Mr. Safeen Dizayee; Director of External Relations for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, 
at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil on January 7, 2005.  He lived his early teens in Erbil. 
“And” he said, “as every Kurd we had to leave Kurdistan in 1974 with the outbreak of the 
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conflict. This led us to live in exile in Iran for three years, until 1977.”  I wondered if he 
had any story of the Ba‟ath Party somehow preventing his education before he left.  He 
replied, “Well, indeed.”   He continued by saying, “When the Ba‟ath Party first took 
power in 1963 there was a movement of ultra-nationalists; the Abd al-Salam Arif period.  
That period was probably the worst for those linked to Kurdish politics.”  His father was 
in the Kurdish movement as a Peshmerga in the mountains.  Mr. Dizayee was an infant at 
the time, but what he was told by his mother and his family is that they were in constant 
hiding. I wondered about those years.  He said, “I spent seven out of eleven years in 
hiding because from 1970 to 1974 there was the peace deal between the Kurdish 
movement and the Baghdad government.  But from 1963, when I was born, until 1970, 
we were in hiding.”  He continued by saying, “There were times when there was dialogue 
between Baghdad and the Kurdish leadership, but it was only meant to have a lull in the 
fighting. The regime was preparing itself to embark on a war against the Kurds again.”  
When he first went to school in 1969 it was a private school in Erbil ran by Chaldean 
nuns.  Instruction was in Arabic and in English.  Kurdish education or Kurdish language 
education was official, but it was limited to certain areas.  He noted, “All the topics or the 
curriculum were a translation of the Arabic text.  They taught Arab nationalism, Arabic 
culture and history, and Islamic history.  There was nothing about local Kurdish history.”  
He noted, “The Kurds would like to take pride in Salahaddin Ayubi, an internationally 
known figure from the Crusades, who was a Kurdish prince, but the Ba‟ath distorted it.  
They taught that he was Arab and from Tikrit.” 
     I asked him to elaborate on the “outbreak of the conflict” in 1974. He explained, “In 
1968 when the Ba„athist came to power again, they were weak.  They were obliged to 
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have an autonomy deal with the Kurds.  On March 11, 1970 the peace deal was agreed 
upon and signed between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government.”  He 
continued, “At that time certain restrictions were lifted. Kurdish ministers were appointed 
to the Iraqi cabinet, along with ambassadors and diplomats, and so on.  During this four 
year „honeymoon‟ you might call it, from 1970 to1974; things were looking relatively 
good, quiet, and peaceful.” However, he said, “Day by day the Iraqi regime was 
regaining their strength. They were after nationalization of the oil and the signing of a 
friendship pact with the Soviets. They managed, during this time, to arm themselves to 
the teeth.”   
     I wondered about education.  He continued, “They also managed to undermine the 
autonomy deal by cutting down on education, by implementing Arabization to certain 
Kurdish areas, and by deporting thousands of Faili Kurds to Iran under the pretext that 
they were of Iranian origin. There were several attempts on the life of the late Kurdish 
leader Mustafa Barzani and on the life of his son Idriss Barzani.” He added, “Part of the 
peace agreement was to conduct censuses in the disputed areas that had majority Kurdish 
populations and thus eventually annex them to Kurdistan.  In many areas education in 
Kurdish was totally forbidden, even with the agreement.” He continued, “This led to a 
review of the autonomy deal in March 1974. Baghdad offered far less than it had in 1970. 
This was not acceptable to the Kurds. This is when the Iraqi regime went back on its 
word and embarked on a major battle in the Kurdish region.  Tens of thousands of 
Kurdish families took refuge in Iran.  The Iranian regime dispersed the Kurds all over 
Iran going as far as the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan.” 
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     Dr. Pary Karadaghi had told me about the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party “master plan” to spread 
the Kurds far and wide.  Mr. Dizayee continued the story of the Iranian regime‟s plan by 
saying, “Initially we had resided in the Kurdish part of Iran; Iranian Kurdistan.  But the 
Kurds of Iraq and Iran could have intermingled and thus were seen as a threat to Iranian 
security.  Only between five and ten Kurdish families were allowed in a single 
settlement.”  He stated, “The hundred thousand or so Kurds living in Iran as refugees had 
to adapt to the life in Iran.  Some people were accepted as refugees to the U.S., Canada, 
and Europe.  Around fifteen to twenty thousand went to Europe.  Around five thousand 
went to the United States.  This was from 1975 until 1977.  A few went to the U.K.”          
 He explained that some senior officials of the Kurdish movement, including family and 
relatives of the Barzanis, were given accommodation in a place called Karaj near Tehran. 
There were some two hundred families in this group, including his.  His father was Iraq‟s 
first ambassador to Canada in 1970.  Towards the end of 1973 his father became Minister 
of Public Works in Baghdad.  That only lasted three months before the collapse of the 
autonomy agreement. That‟s when his father had to resign and then he rejoined the 
Kurdish movement.  Mr. Safeen Dizayee had to adapt to a new way of life in Iran.  He 
attended secondary school in Farsi in Qurush. Then General Barzani became ill with lung 
cancer in 1976.  His father, as part of an entourage, accompanied the general to the 
United States for medical treatment.  It was very difficult for his family to be in Iran with 
his father in the U.S. His father decided that the family should move out of Iran and go to 
Europe.  In September of 1977 they moved to the U.K.  With the death of General 
Barzani in 1979 his father joined them.  He lived and was educated in the U.K. until 
1991.  From 1974 until 1991 he could not come back to Erbil.  He couldn‟t see his 
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relatives.  He said, “We had a long wait until the uprising of 1991.  It was in November 
of 1991 when I first managed to come back.  I left as a child and I came back as a grown-
up.”  As with Mr. Qubad Talabany, I am very grateful Mr. Safeen Dizayee‟s father 
protected him and moved his family to the U.K.  I was deeply touched by this man‟s 
kind, gentle demeanor.  It was a privilege to listen to the Kurdish story so eloquently 
articulated in English. 
      The Ba‟ath Party had a long arm and threatened Dr. Karadaghi while she was 
studying in Romania. They came to her apartment and summoned her to the Iraqi 
embassy.  All of the Kurdish students there at the time went with her to protect her. The 
consul questioned her need for protection, as Iraq was her country.  They had confiscated 
her passport some time before.  She said, “If it were my country I would still have my 
passport, but since I do not have a passport, I am not an Iraqi.”  He suggested that it 
would be very easy for her to get an Iraqi passport and a scholarship. The only “catch” 
was frightening.  He actually told her, “All I need is your father.”  She refused to 
cooperate and said, “As long as you do not recognize me as an Iraqi citizen, I do not 
recognize your passport.”   What she told me next was shocking.  She related: 
It‟s very tough.  I knew that I had nothing to lose.  This was a man who was very 
powerful.  He had blood on his hands.  There were many, many Iraqi people in the 
Diaspora who had gone into Iraqi embassies and never came out.  They were found in 
diplomatic pouches. Their heads had been sent back to their family members.  I wasn‟t 
going to be intimidated by a criminal like him.  I had no sympathy for him or allegiance. 
  
     She left.  That was the last time she saw an Iraqi until the Liberation of Iraq in 2003; 
twenty-one years later.  She was still afraid.  
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Ba’ath Pan –Arabism 
 
      Iraqi scholarships were given to Palestinian, Jordanian, Yemeni, and Libyan students 
studying in Romania at the time Dr. Karadaghi was there. The scholarships were $500 
per month.  These were all Arab countries.  I wondered about this and she said, “Of 
course, Saddam was into pan–Arabism.”  She continued by telling me that students who 
signed up to be Iraqi Ba'ath Party followers would be given scholarships and that most of 
the Palestinian students were holding Iraqi scholarships in addition to their Romanian 
scholarships. She said, “The Palestinian authority had negotiated many scholarships with 
the Romanian authority and the Palestinians were coming to school for free.”   
     Ms. Soraya Serajeddini was disappointed with the Palestinian authority and Saddam‟s 
pan-Arabism policies when she was a student at San Francisco State in 1981. She recalls 
one day going to the cafeteria and seeing tables put together.  Around thirty people, 
mostly male, were sitting smoking. They were Palestinian students having a meeting.  
The idea of human rights and self determination were appealing to Soraya and she 
befriended them.  For awhile it was working until she thought something needed to be 
done on the Kurdish side. It was then that the Palestinian students told her “Oh, we have 
to get approval from the PLO. We can‟t do anything that is anti-Saddam.”  It was a stark 
realization for her.  An excerpt from our conversation follows: 
SS:  For me it was a realization that this is not a world wide quest for human rights and 
minority rights.  Basically, everyone is out for their own interests.  You can be trampled 
on.  It was all a front and a joke about working together and that we had an alliance . . . 
JJ:  No altruism? 
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SS:  It was pretty much ethno-centric.  That was one of my first lessons in San Francisco 
that I will never forget. 
      At the beginning of this document there is a quote that says the human heart is the 
first home of democracy.  Many people have asked me during this research if I were a 
Kurd.  I am not.  The Palestinian students‟ position at San Francisco State was born out 
of fear.  Fear of the long arm of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. 
     While Dr. Karadaghi was studying in Romania officials at the Iraqi embassy asked the 
Ministry of Education to send her back to Iraq.  One morning at about 7a.m. two 
Romanian secret service men knocked at the door of her dormitory room and then pushed 
their way in.  She asked them what they wanted.  They replied, “We have nothing against 
you. We have nothing against your family, but the Iraqi embassy wants you.”  She asked 
them what the embassy wanted. This was 1981.  They said, “Well, there is a war going 
on with Iran and they want you to go and fight.  And they need medical people.” She 
said, “But I haven‟t graduated yet.  I know nothing.  I am in school.  I won‟t graduate 
until 1985.” They said, “That‟s okay, you can still do something. They want you.”  She 
refused to go.  They said, “Then we will deport you.  We will put you on a plane and 
send you back to Iraq.”  She picked up the phone and dialed the American embassy.  It 
was doubtful anyone would answer given the early hour, but they left.  She was scared to 
death.  
     She went to the American embassy and talked to the consul.  They said they were 
sorry but they couldn‟t do anything because she was not a U.S. citizen nor were her 
parents. Her parents had just applied for political asylum. She said, “In 1980 the U.S. had 
a friendly relationship with Iraq.  The U.S. actually denied my parents‟ political asylum 
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as there was no „reasonable fear of persecution.‟  They said, „What do you mean the 
Iraqis are gassing your people?  What do you mean they are killing people?‟ Even though 
my father had many documents, nothing could be substantiated.”  She went to the United 
Nations.  The UNDP was an American.  She spoke to him in English and he said, “Oh, 
you speak English, I am dying here, nobody speaks English and where did you learn that 
English?”  She replied that she had gone to middle school in English in Jakarta.  He asked 
her to come every week and just talk.  They became friends.  He contacted the UNCR 
(The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Geneva.  Dr. Karadaghi 
applied for political asylum and protection.  In six months she got an approval.  She was 
considered a refugee through the 1951 refugee convention.  The UNDP, Mr. Acorn, 
contacted the Romanian authorities. She finished her last years of school.  She was a 
refugee and nobody harassed her, but she didn‟t have a passport.  She was stateless.  In 
1984 when she only had a few months left on her student visa, she went to the French 
embassy and met with the consul. Mr. Acorn had contacted the French consul and in 
three months she was accepted to go to France. They had written her saying they would 
be happy to receive her and her family as refugees. In May of 1985 she and her family 
went to the airport to board a plane to France.  Mr. Acorn accompanied them. At the 
airport they told her that her son was a Romanian and that she was kidnapping a 
Romanian citizen. They did not want her to board the plane.  There was a plane leaving 
from Bucharest to Baghdad in two hours. They wanted her to return to Iraq; deliver her 
into the hands of the Iraqi authorities. 
       The Romanians spent an hour or so looking through their books unable to find record 
of Dr. Karadaghi‟s entrance into Romania; when they had seized her passport. Mr. Acorn 
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was very upset and told them, “If you don‟t get her passport I am closing the mission 
down and I am not giving you any more assistance.  And your Danube water can go to 
hell.”  He took his own passport and threw it on the floor.  It went sliding across the 
airport. And he didn‟t pick it up.  A Romanian colonel, with a very well-decorated 
uniform, picked up the passport and brought it back.  Mr. Acorn didn‟t even look at him. 
They finally brought the 1978 register.  Right there in the 1978 register, on the day Dr. 
Karadaghi had entered, was her name.  The colonel kept skipping the pages and Dr. 
Karadaghi said, “That‟s my name.”  He said, “No, that‟s not you.”  She said, “Look at my 
name, my passport number, and the date I entered and the time, the flight #, that‟s me.”  
It took them another hour.  The French captain came down.  It was an Air France flight.  
He said, “What‟s the problem?  We‟re holding the plane.”  Mr. Icorn told him, “Don‟t 
leave.  Because their intention is if you leave there is a flight to Baghdad and they are 
going to put her on that flight.”  Dr. Karadaghi said, “The Air France plane didn‟t leave.  
It was supposed to leave at 9 o‟clock.  The captain held it and they stayed on until 11 
o‟clock.  Everyone was upset.  All the people on the plane were upset, but this was a 
flight of freedom.  The French all came out of the plane.  Nobody left.  They all stood 
there.  It took another two hours.”  Finally, the Romanians let her and her family go. Mr. 
Acorn held on to their hands and escorted them to the plane. He stood on the tarmac until 
they left.  Dr. Karadaghi lived in France from 1985 to 1989 working as a medical doctor.  
I am proud that an American, Mr. Acorn, listened to Dr. Karadaghi, believed in her, 
assisted her in getting her education, and facilitated her “flight of freedom.” 
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The Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising  
      I first met with Dr. Mohammad Ihsan in his office in Erbil as Minister of Human 
Rights for the Kurdistan Regional Government.  He had mentioned hiding in a basement 
in Mosul after the quelling of the Kurdish uprising in 1991. I later recorded him at the 
Sheraton hotel in Erbil on December 26, 2004.  It took me several days to recover from 
my conversation with him as it was an intense and emotional one.  He started thinking 
about politics at the age of five.  He didn‟t have a single toy as a child.  He was never 
given a chance to be a teenager.  He was the top student in his high school but he refused 
to learn Arabic. He told me: 
Until the university, I refused to get my education in Arabic.  I was going to get all my 
education in Kurdish.  I was accepted as a student in The College of Law, which is the 
top college of Iraq in Baghdad. There was a topic, part of the curriculum of the university 
at that time, which they called “National Education.”  National Education was all about 
the Ba‟athists.  Because of that course I dropped from the College of Law in Baghdad to 
the College of Arts, English Department at the University of Mosul.   
      
     He graduated from the University of Mosul in 1988 and was appointed to a military 
academy. An excerpt of the conversation follows:  
MI: Upon finishing the university I was appointed to a military academy in Iraq.  They 
dropped me from there because I was not a member of the Ba‟ath Party.   
JJ:  You went to a military academy, not just the regular military, because you were 
educated?  
MI:  Right.  Because by law at that time, when you finished your university degree you 
had to go to military academy.  I was trained and then they dropped me and I had to go to 
the regular army because I wouldn‟t join the Ba‟ath Party.  I stayed one year and nine 
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months in the south of Iraq, in Basra.  Before the Gulf War I was evacuated from the 
army.  Then, before the invasion of Kuwait, I joined the Peshmerga in the mountains. 
     He continued by telling me that he then found his way to Turkey as it was too harsh in 
the mountains with the Peshmerga. He was a refugee in the camps of Diyarbakir and 
Solopi.  At the beginning of the 1991 uprising he returned to Iraqi Kurdistan and traveled 
to Mosul to be part of the process there.  He related a story of exceptional courage and 
survival: 
JJ: Was the population of Mosul mostly Kurdish at that time? 
MI:  It was around fifty percent. 
JJ:  And prior to World War I? 
MI:  The majority was Kurdish then.  If you look at the issue of Mosul Vilayet, 
immediately after the war there was an issue between the United Kingdom or the new 
Iraq, and the Ottoman Empire or the new Turkey over Mosul.   
JJ:  Yes. 
MI:  The United League sent a commission to Mosul.  They named that commission 
Mosul Vilayet. That committee recommended that Mosul should be a part of independent 
Kurdistan.  Then some Shi‟a Arabs in the south started to revolt.  The British decided to 
forcibly join these two parts of Iraq to at least present a balance between Sunni and Shi‟a 
in the country.  We were victims of that policy as well.  In 1991, on the first day of the 
uprising I went to Mosul to get in touch with the Kurds there.  Mosul was still under Iraqi 
control.  I stayed about 10 to 12 days building networks, meeting Kurds; Kurdish tribe 
leaders, Kurdish politicians, Kurds who were in Iraq working with Iraqis.  I managed to 
 76 
create something . . . but the last days were . . . one day I was informed that we had lost 
Kurdistan.  Iraq had managed to occupy Kurdistan again. 
     Iraqi forces entered Kurdistan, which ended the uprising.  Dr. Ihsan and one other 
were left behind in Mosul, now enemy territory.  He had one of his family‟s friends there; 
an old woman.  She was very poor and had just one bedroom in her basement.  She hid 
him there.  It was the only place he could be safe or get help at that time.  His friends had 
started to say, “We don‟t know you” and to say, “Please go away you are going to make a 
problem for us.  We don‟t want to be executed for you.”  Dr. Ihsan stayed forty-two days 
in that basement in Mosul.  Finally, he decided to leave, even if it was going to cost him 
his life.  He was carrying $2,000 Iraqi dinar. He told me that at that time that was about 
$6,000 dollars.  He paid $6,000 to a boat driver to take him from one side of Saddam‟s 
Lake to the other.  The lake was near the Syrian border.  It took two to three hours.  It 
was dangerous and it was at night.  He then walked to the Turkish border, to Zakho, 
where his family lived.  It took five days.  His family had been informed that he was 
dead.  Wherever he went people looked at his face and said, “This is a ghost coming out 
of the grave.”  When he finally got to his family‟s home everything was dark.  They were 
all wearing black because they were in mourning.  They thought because he had not 
appeared for forty-two days that he must be dead.  He told me that at that time whenever 
the Iraqis captured any Kurd over twelve years old, they killed him.  His family thought 
he was one of those . . .  
     Dr. Ihsan still wakes up at night sweating, thinking that he is in that basement in 
Mosul hiding.  He said his wife wonders if he will ever get over this trauma.  I tried to 
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imagine what it would be like to be in such grave danger and to have all your friends 
disown you. 
      Dr.Kafia Mawloud‟s education was interrupted by the Gulf War.  I spoke with her in 
mid December of 2004 in her office as Dean of the Nursing College at the University of 
Salahaddin in Erbil.  She began her Ph.D. in Baghdad in 1990 at Saddam University; 
College of Science. There were three students; herself and two Arabs. She had the highest 
grades in the class.  She recalls it as being a very difficult environment. She was 
threatened and harassed daily and constantly pressured to join the Ba‟ath Party. They 
said, “When you finish your studies, you must stay here. We will not allow you to take 
your doctorate from Saddam University and serve the Kurdish nation.”  She progressed 
and was always the best one, but when she received her grades, as with Mr. Falah 
Mustafa Bakir, they put her at the same level as the Arab students.  She asked the teacher 
about it one day and he said, “I don‟t want there to be a gap between you and the other 
students.”  
     Until the night Baghdad was bombed she was in Saddam University. She had stayed 
in Baghdad because she had an examination.  Saddam‟s palace was near the university 
and she watched the bombs bursting in the sky all night. The next day she left Baghdad 
and returned to Erbil.  She stayed there six months until the war ended. The day she 
returned to Saddam University they told her she had an examination. The other two Arab 
students were told they had the exam several days later, but she was punished for being 
Kurdish.  She took the exam and got a very high grade. She told me of a memory she had 
from that time that in her words “will never ever leave her mind.”   
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     Rather than fleeing when Saddam‟s men came back to crush the revolt, Dr. Mawloud 
stayed in Erbil with her mother and sister. Her mother wasn‟t able to walk well and there 
was no public transportation.  They went to her sister‟s home. There they couldn‟t speak.  
They couldn‟t use the electricity. They couldn‟t make any noise. They didn‟t have any 
food.  They would have been killed if they had been found. The second day in the 
morning they heard some people talking outside the door.  They said that Saddam‟s 
soldiers were destroying all the houses in their way.”  Dr. Mawloud‟s family home was 
“in their way.”  They decided to go see the extent of the damage to their house.  They 
walked in “Saddam‟s road.”  She told me, “What I saw… this was not a city.  I had only 
seen something like this in a film. It was unbelievable and unexpected.  When they came 
they killed all the Kurdish people and they were lying in the street.  We were walking on 
them.  We were walking on dead bodies.  This picture…will never, ever leave my 
mind…”  The conversation continued: 
KM: When we reached our house we saw that the doors were open and everything was 
removed, but not damaged, not damaged.  My brother‟s house was damaged.  All the 
doors had been locked.  Saddam‟s men had shot the doors open by gun.  We stayed for a 
few days as I mentioned before, without eating.  
JJ:  Stayed back in your house? 
KM:  No, only two or three hours we stayed at our house and then we went back to my 
sister‟s.  We remained there for a few days.  There wasn‟t any food.  There wasn‟t any 
water.  There was no electricity.  After a few days we returned home.  In addition to this 
bad environment, we were hearing about our other family members; our brothers, our 
uncles, our cousins. They had fled and we were hearing bad news about them. Saddam 
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had bombed and destroyed them in the way.  We were so sad for them.  We thought that 
they had all died; that all of them were dead. My mother was crying, “I will be alone, all 
my sons and family were killed by Saddam‟s destruction.”   My two brothers were in 
Kirkuk as soldiers. When they heard about the destruction they left Kirkuk. They walked 
to Mosul and then from Mosul to Erbil.  When they reached Erbil and our home, they 
were almost dead.  
JJ:  They were so exhausted, because it was so far . . .  
KM:  Their legs were damaged.  But after one or two weeks the Peshmerga returned and 
Saddam‟s soldiers left.  Our government, the Kurdish government, started to function and 
from that time on we have been very stable.   
Summary 
          This chapter presents the narrative in the category of Promise. The data unfold 
stories of those closely linked to Kurdish politics:  being beaten in a Baghdad elementary 
classroom for not speaking Arabic, being forced to study in Farsi in exile in Iran, and 
being harassed, threatened, and intimidated while seeking a medical degree in Romania.  
The data tell of a promising Kurdish law student dropping out of law school in Baghdad 
and later being dropped from a military academy for not following Ba‟athist ideology. 
And finally, the data expose a top Kurdish doctoral student being told by the Ba‟ath, “We 
will not allow you to take your doctorate from Saddam University and serve the Kurdish 
nation.” Dr. Mohammad Ihsan notes, “Sometimes it makes you stronger, but sometimes 
you find that you have not been through normal channels in your life.  We as Kurds have 
been through really hard times; disasters, a lot of bearing trauma and yet, we are going 
ahead with it.”  Chapter Seven presents the data within the category of Imagination. 
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CHAPTER VII 
IMAGINATION 
 
Introduction 
     The previous chapter of this dissertation presents the narrative the data depict within 
the category of Promise.  This chapter presents the data in the Imagination category. The 
narrative tells of the influence the 2003 Liberation of Iraq, the democratic Iraqi elections, 
and the subsequent Iraqi constitution have had on education policy development in 
Kurdistan, Iraq.  The data also speak to how the Kurds imagine the future for themselves. 
The presentation includes the subsections: The 2003 Liberation of Iraq; Federalism, 
Union by Choice with Iraq, and Powers Greater than the Ba‟ath Party; The Iraqi 
Constitution and Utopian Education Policy.  A summary concludes the chapter. 
The 2003 Liberation of Iraq  
 
      I spoke with Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz in his office as Minister of Humanitarian Aid and 
Cooperation for the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil on January 10, 2005 three 
weeks before the January 30
th
 elections.  He was telling me how the history of the 
Kurdish language had been “a very long and uphill battle within the Iraqi regime.”  He 
spoke about the Local Language Law, passed under the British in 1931, and implemented 
only in a limited way, and about the TAL, governing Iraq at the time, recognizing 
Kurdish as an official language. I asked him what he anticipated for the language part 
following the transitional period.  He responded by saying, “It is not just the language 
part; it is my anticipation of the whole set-up.”  I asked him to elaborate.  He said: 
If we go back a few years before the liberation you will notice that although the Kurds 
had been almost totally separate from Baghdad and Saddam‟s regime for twelve or 
thirteen years, nonetheless, the Kurds came forth and tried to put together an Iraqi 
opposition that managed to work with the CPA, to work with America, and to finally 
liberate Iraq. I think any fair-minded person would have to admit that the Kurds, probably 
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more than their share, have contributed to and aided the liberation of Iraq.  But at the 
same time I think, this is where the problem comes, here you have one of the major 
nationalities in Iraq, the Kurds, being separate from the Iraqi government. This separation 
was by the decision of the Iraqi government itself.  It withdrew its administration in 
October 1991 and then applied an internal economic blockade on Kurdistan in addition to 
the international blockade.  At that time the Iraqi regime not only withdrew its support 
but it became antagonistic.  
     According to Dr. Qazzaz, the Kurds realized after ruling themselves for thirteen years, 
that even with the difficulties, including an internal war, they were able to do it. This was 
very important.  He said, “We like to be ruled by our own leaders. It is quite natural.  
There has been a revival of the idea that we are a people, a nation.  We deserve the 
ultimate realization of self-determination.”  He went on to say that Iraq had been 
liberated in its land and its regime, but not in its mentality and that this was a terrible 
awakening fro the Kurds.  He said they realized that the concept of being highly 
centralized, of Baghdad having to control everything, to control the Kurds, to run 
everything seemed very difficult to change.  He said Iraq had been liberated and Saddam 
was gone, but that their were other people in Baghdad and that “The allies we had 
yesterday, in terms of political groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, all of whom 
composed the Iraqi opposition, today have broken-down to their true, ethnic, sectarian, 
religious whatever.”  He commented: 
We realized that well the Kurds have to be Kurds.  The Arabs have to be Arabs.  The 
Shiites have to be Shiites.  The Sunnis are Sunnis. Now, everyone is what they are.  And 
you can‟t blame them. I mean the Shiites, some say they represent 60%, even if they 
represent 45%, they are the biggest group in Iraq.  For eight decades of the Iraqi system 
of government they have been downtrodden.  All their rights have been trampled on.  A 
Sunni Arab minority ruled throughout the entire history of the state of Iraq.  This is by 
any means unfair.  The Shiites may think in terms of more than just a secular, democratic, 
modern, egalitarian, government.  They probably have something else in mind. 
      
     I asked him to talk about how the Kurds envision a federal Iraq; what federalism 
means to them. 
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Federalism 
     What exactly does federalism mean to the Kurds?  According to Dr. Qazzaz, it means 
guarantees.  Federal, as far as the Kurds are concerned, is a Kurdistan that has its own 
government.  The borders should be historical and geographic and clearly delineate the 
Kurdistan region.  This corresponds to the original Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul.  He said, 
“In other words, certain things have not changed.  The Kurds are the same Kurds who 
lived in the 1920s within the confines of the Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul, which was a 
point of contention between the British, the Turks, and the newly created Iraqi 
government.”  For obvious economic reasons, he said, and against the will of the Kurds, 
they annexed it to the Iraqi government.  He said the same thing exists today. In his 
words the Kurds are saying, “For eighty years your arrangement did not work.  We are 
not going to wait another eighty years.  We are not going to allow the Halabjas, the 
Anfals and Arabization to happen here again.  We want iron-clad guarantees.”  The 
Kurdistan federal region would be part of a larger federal Iraq, but it is not equivalent to 
the United States.  Dr. Qazzaz emphasized that this is where the U.S. made its mistake 
and continues to do so.  He said, “The U.S. sees it as Pennsylvania vs. Washington, D.C., 
but it is a very different situation.”  He commented on the unifying American identity; a 
characteristic absent in Iraq: 
There, through time, people became Americans.  They call them Spanish-Americans or 
Irish-Americans, but they are Americans.  In our case, this unifying Iraqi identity does 
not exist, because Iraq itself, as an entity, does not exist.  You cannot just create it 
overnight.  You see, it is just like their [the U.S.] concept of democracy.  We are more 
democratic in Kurdistan than any part of Iraq or even the Middle East.  That is the one 
thing that we have proven. But that doesn‟t mean that democracy for Iraq is going to 
solve all these problems overnight.  It cannot happen that way.  This is where the 
Americans are not willing to concede, you see.  Any change, any idea, any progress in 
this thing.  Their federalism is flawed.  Their idea of democracy, how it works, is flawed.  
Not because Iraq cannot become democratic, but it will take time.  You cannot do it on 
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the basis of democracy today.  You have to do it on the basis of something else. A 
concrete system of government which is tangible, delineated, specified, institutionalized; 
where the Kurds can safely co-exist in Iraq.        
     He concluded by saying that is why the Kurds are only going to be part of Iraq on a 
voluntary basis. We talked about the Peshmerga; about the CPA wanting to disband 
them.   
The Peshmerga 
     Dr. Qazzaz said, “To us the Peshmerga is definitely not a militia and it is not an army.  
It is what has protected these people.  It is the one guarantee that we have against certain 
things happening again.”  I also talked to Mr. Safeen Dizayee about the Peshmerga. We 
were talking about the security issue on the ground in Iraq at the time.  He said that there 
were serious efforts by some advisors to dismantle or disband the Peshmerga.  The KRG 
fought it very hard. The KRG said: 
First of all stop calling the Peshmerga militia.  They are not militia.  Our understanding of 
militia is something which has been formed for a specific purpose, but the people have 
formed the Peshmerga.  No political organizations formed them.  They are a well-
organized military.  By the Kurdistan Parliament‟s decree they have become a regular 
force.  If you want to use them in the rest of Iraq, fine.  We don‟t want our sons to be 
killed in the streets of Fallujah or Basra, but since they are Iraqis, they should serve all 
parts of Iraq.  If you don‟t want to use them, their experience, fine.  They can live within 
the luxury of Kurdistan and the security of Kurdistan. 
 
     Mr. Dizayee said that unfortunately the CPA did not listen. He continued by saying, 
“They, the CPA, later started drafting Peshmerga into what was known as the ICDC; the 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corp.  It later became the ING; the Iraqi National Guard. The best 
officers and the best Peshmerga were offered to these battalions by the KRG.”  The 
Kurdistan Regional Government also provided the Iraqi government with many ministers 
including the vice president, the deputy prime minister, and the foreign minister and 
others including chief of staff, head of intelligence, and director of security.   
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Union by Choice with Iraq 
     Mr. Dizayee emphasized that the aforementioned Kurds were all risking their lives in 
Baghdad. He said, “They could have been living in the luxury of Kurdistan.  They all had 
senior positions.  But they decided to go to Baghdad, to prove that the Kurds were not 
encouraging disintegration or separatism.”  He continued by saying, “One thing that 
should not be forgotten is that the Kurds want „union by choice with the rest of Iraq.‟  
There are Arabs and Kurds.  Yes, there are Turcoman, Assyrians, Chaldean, but there are 
two main people; Arabs and Kurds.  For us it is a union by choice with the Arabs.”  He 
went on to say, “Federalism is the best solution to reunite Iraq.  Before the war Iraq was 
already divided.  You had the Kurdish region.  You had two no-fly zones, so the Iraqi 
regime was responsible for central Iraq and more or less that was it.”  Mr. Dizayee 
believes that in going to Baghdad the Kurds showed, and continue to show, their sincerity 
to reunite Iraq. He concluded by saying, “We certainly believe in a united, democratic, 
federal Iraq.  This is our policy.  But if the rest of Iraq does not believe in that, I don‟t 
think the Kurds should be blamed for the disintegration of Iraq.”  
Powers Greater than the Ba’ath Party 
     I spoke with Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, representative of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government to the UN, USA, and Canada at the time, in his office in McLean, Virginia 
on August 28, 2006.  He graduated from Al-Hikma University, an American Jesuit 
university, in Baghdad in 1964 and was telling me about an incident that happened there 
before he graduated.  He said: 
In 1963 when the Ba‟ath first came to power there were activities and some students 
wanted to join the Ba‟ath Party. The Party gave them all sorts of duties so this affected 
their education. They were not showing up for classes or exams. At the end of the year 
the Jesuit fathers would not pass them. The students went to the Ba‟ath people and 
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complained. They said, „These Americans will not graduate us. They have given us 
failing marks because we are nationalistic and we are supporting our Party.‟ So, the 
government sent a letter to the administrators of Al-Hikma University asking them to 
graduate these students. They did, but they wrote on their diplomas of graduation „passed 
by government decree.‟  
 
     Mr. Shemdin continued by telling me that the Ba‟ath Party closed Al-Hikma 
University five years after he graduated for “not teaching an ideology that coincided with 
Ba‟athism.”   
    I mentioned to Mr. Shemdin that I was very inspired by the Kurds I had met and that 
there was something special about the Kurdish spirit.  I asked him what he thought it was. 
He told me that a few years ago the Kurdistan Development Corporation had held a 
conference in Erbil and had invited a lot of potential investors.  One of them made the 
following observation.  He said, “We know the Kurds have gone through a lot of misery 
and tragedy and yet we never, ever see it on their faces. They are so warm.  They are so 
hospitable.  They are so nice.  They are so relaxed. How do they do it?” Upon reflection 
Mr. Shemdin said he thought that the Kurds are not a vengeful people.  An excerpt from 
our conversation follows: 
 JJ: That is what is different about the Kurds; different from the Arabs.  
NS: The Kurds think that it is a fate that has come upon them that they will try to endure. 
Then they will try to do better, to learn from the experience. If a calamity happens to 
them, they will try to persevere and better themselves towards the future. Not look at the 
past. That process, the whole process, makes them more mature people. That's why you 
see them relaxed, hospitable, and warm. The past is the past, they will not forget it, but 
they will not just dwell on it, they want to go ahead with their lives and do something 
better. If you look at their poetry there is lament, but they are always looking towards a 
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future, whereas if you look at Arabic songs and poetry there is a lot of lamenting period, 
and blaming others. 
JJ: They blame and extract punishment . . .  
NS: If you look at this experience that the Kurds went through, which was really 
genocide; when you pick out people for whom they are and try to eliminate them that is 
genocide. I think God loves the Kurds in that they were not annihilated. There are powers 
greater than the Ba'ath Party that came into action and protected the Kurds and eventually 
brought Saddam to trial. So God works in mysterious ways. It is the Kurds who do not 
really wish to take revenge. They just want justice to take its place. It is the Arabs who 
want to have Saddam dragged in the streets. 
The Iraqi Constitution 
     I spoke with Dr. Pary Karadaghi about the constitution and federalism.  She said the 
Iraqi constitution has recognized the federal Kurdish state.  She went on to say: 
The Kurdistan Regional Government is a legitimate entity.  There is a parliament.  There 
is an authority.  It is functioning very well.  It runs its own affairs.  It is negotiating 
revenues and resources with the central government.  It has not done anything wrong.  It 
has not proclaimed a country.  It is what is keeping Iraq together. If the Kurds were to get 
out of the union with Iraq, there would be no Iraq.  
      
     I mentioned to Dr. Karadaghi what Mr. Qubad Talabany had said at the KNCNA 
conference the year before about the Kurds needing to “prepare for the failed state of 
Iraq.”  I wondered how she thought that would work or play out.  She responded by 
saying: 
But the United States has to admit that it has failed.  They won‟t.  There has to be a 
referendum.  The people of Iraq have to decide what they want.  The referendum in 
Kirkuk is very important because it is the implementation of Article 140.  And in order to 
decide, I don‟t care what Baker-Hamilton said in „The Iraq Study Group Report,‟ because 
they have no understanding of how Iraq works.  How Iraqi people think.  The Iraqi 
constitution still has loopholes in it.  They have to be closed.  There have to be 
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amendments.  There are several problems with it.  But, again, that‟s another thing the 
people of Iraq have to decide.  They have to draft amendments and laws have to be 
decided on. 
 
      We talked about the new “re-Bathification” law and she said: 
 
We have to have a truth and reconciliation.  People have to know that those who were in 
charge of the Ba'ath Party, who held positions of power, who have blood on their hands, 
cannot, should not, be allowed to…if they take responsibility for their crimes and justice 
takes its course…I am not talking about the death penalty for all of them, but maybe 
some prison sentencing. 
  
     She continued by saying that this was the U.S. pushing towards bringing the Sunnis on 
board.  But she said, “It is not the Ba'ath people who will bring the Sunnis on board.”  
She said “If you lived at that time in Iraq and you remember that you would get a knock 
on the door at 12 o‟clock at night and people were taken from their homes and never seen 
again.  How can you forgive the person who took your family members and tortured or 
killed them?”  She said she could forgive people for what they did, but why allow them to 
be in a position of power?  What is to say that they wouldn‟t do it again? 
     I likened it to the Nazis.  She said, “If someone was a Nazi and was one of the 
generals who worked for the German occupation in France and went door to door in 
Marseilles and took Jewish people and killed them.  Two months later is it okay now for 
this person to go and serve in the German army, no.  It is hard to forgive what they 
did…we can move on…but we can't forget.”  Dr. Karadaghi believes it was just a 
coincidence that Saddam Hussein was a Sunni.  She commented, “He could have been 
from anywhere. He was a criminal person, an evil person. Religion didn‟t have anything 
to do with it.”  She said: 
It was his survival instinct that made him surround himself with his clan and give them 
positions.  He did not trust them either.  It was not like there was this big happy family 
who were all holding hands and singing Kum-bay-ya just because they were Sunnis.  It 
didn‟t work that way.  The fact remains that he hated everyone else.  He would kill 
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anyone who opposed him, whether he was a Sunni, a Christian, a Shiite or a Kurd. If you 
look into the Ba'ath Party history…he killed many Sunnis as well.  He killed many of his 
own family members; his own uncle, his own father-in-law, his own sons-in-law.  It‟s not 
just because he was a Sunni and all the Sunnis had this blanket umbrella of being safe 
around him.  If they opposed him, he would kill them.  The Sunnis were in a position of 
power, but not all Sunnis profited from the Ba'ath Party.  There were many Sunnis who 
went to jail.  There were many Sunnis who were discriminated against.  If you were not a 
Ba'ath Party member, then you didn‟t stand a chance whether you were a Sunni or a 
Shiite.  If you were a Ba'ath Party member and you signed your life with blood to the 
Party, you could have been a Kurd and he still would have had you in his corner.  He 
wouldn‟t have trusted you completely, but the fact remains that there are many, many 
Sunnis who hated Saddam Hussein, who were not in favor of him, so to lump all the 
Sunnis of Iraq… 
 
     I asked Dr. Karadaghi what she wanted to happen in regards to federalism and the 
constitution.  Characteristically she said, “It‟s up to the Kurds to decide what they want.  
This is their decision.”  
Utopian Education Policy 
     I spoke with Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of Salahaddin, in his 
newly renovated office on December 26, 2004.  We were talking about the story of his 
education and I asked him about the situation at the university now that Iraq had been 
liberated.  The following is an excerpt from our conversation: 
MS:  I think the situation is excellent in some ways. First of all we live in a free Iraq and 
a free Kurdistan.  Kurdistan has been free from the Iraqi regime since 1991, but there was 
always a threat that it might come back at any time.  
JJ:  As long as Saddam was around? 
MS:  Yes. The town that I mentioned, Qushtapa, was near the front lines with Saddam. 
He could have gotten to the city in less than half an hour, twenty minutes, anytime he 
wanted.  So, although we were free, we were always frightened that he might come back. 
Now, thank God, with the help of the Americans, the good friends, Saddam has gone.  
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There is a lot to be done in our country. Especially in the Kurdistan region if we are 
talking about education.  I have a lot to say about that.  Education, as you know, is free at 
all levels; including the university level. Students are paid subsistence allowances.  They 
are paid, given accommodations, everything. That means the state; the Kurdistan 
Regional Government is spending a lot on students.  I don‟t agree with that. 
JJ:  I don‟t either.  
MS:  Free education is vital for the early ages, but after that, no. At the moment we have 
a course of students that the Kurdistan Regional Government pays about 35 dollars a 
month. As you know the salary of a worker . . . 
JJ:  Actually, I don‟t know. 
MS:  A graduate earns about 150 . . . 
JJ:  150 dollars a month? 
MS:  No, 150,000 Iraqi dinar, which is around 100 dollars a month. 
JJ:  After you graduate? 
MS:  After you graduate and you do everything, you get that. 
JJ:  And the university student gets 35 dollars a month, plus housing, and . . .  
MS: . . . they don‟t pay for electricity; they don‟t pay for water . . . 
JJ:  So it is like communism, right? 
MS:  Absolutely.  And this is one thing that I really don‟t agree with.  The KRG has been 
very generous, but I would like to spend the money on other things of higher priority.    
     Dr. Sadik also talked about education expanding quantitatively since 1991, but not 
qualitatively.  He said:  
The Kurdistan Regional Government has given a lot of attention to education and it has 
expanded quantitatively since 1991.  The Iraqi regime razed about 5,000 villages.  Now, 
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all of these villages have been rebuilt and all of them have schools.  Even if there is just 
one room, the children have a teacher and are getting an education.  This is very good 
quantitatively.  But on the qualitative side, I don‟t think our aspirations are being met.  
One area of great weakness, which Prime Minister Barzani recognizes very well, is the 
curriculum, the textbooks.  We still follow the system of education that has been set for 
us by the Arab Ba‟ath Socialist Party.  The books are still the same. The education 
authorities at the Kurdistan Regional Government have cleared a lot of things away in an 
attempt to rid the books of Ba‟athist ideology, but I don‟t agree with that.  You cannot fit 
your system into someone else‟s. We must have, Kurdistan must have, its own system of 
education. The education system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has followed the same 
program for a number of years.  Recently, some changes have been made in the provision 
of education, yet no significant changes have been made in the philosophy of education.   
 
     The following are ten points that Dr. Mohammad Sadik and Dr. Narin Mayiwar would 
like the philosophy of Kurdish education to embody: 
1.  We believe that as a first step we have to identify and base the Kurdistan system of 
education on the values, traditions, economy, and ideals of its people.   
2.  And although this system of education is based on the unique cultural identity of the 
Kurds, it also seeks to promote a diverse world view.  The Kurdistan region has been cut 
off from the outside world for the past fifteen years.  We were subjected to double 
economic blockades, which kept us isolated. There were the sanctions on Iraq. We were 
regarded as part of Iraq and subjected to those sanctions, but also we were subjected to 
more severe sanctions from the Iraqi regime itself.  They didn‟t allow anything to come 
to the Kurdish area.  That is why we want our education to be unique and based on 
Kurdish identity, but we also do not want to be isolated.  We want to learn from the 
experience of good people and good systems around the world.   
3. The third thing that we believe is that this education system should promote 
democratic values and civic responsibility in both faculty and students.   
4. The fourth thing, and this is very important, is we believe that this education system 
should not promote just one religion; but it should recognize the history and contributions 
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of all world religions.  One of the hardest subjects in our schools is religion.  Children at 
the age of six, seven, eight, and nine have to memorize verses of the Koran, which is very 
difficult because the Kurdish children can‟t read or write in Arabic. We believe that 
students should be given the choice to study what they want to, especially in religion.  
Why should we be frightened to teach them something about Buddhism, Sikhism, 
Christianity, or any other religions that are around?  Why should we be frightened of 
that?   
5.  We also believe that this system of education should respect the child student.  It 
should strengthen the heart, mind, emotion, and body of the student, and do no harm.  
There is still violence and corporal punishment in Iraq.  It is not allowed officially, but it 
still happens.  Teachers do not respect children.  They do not respect the students.  A 
child is a human.  You can‟t terrorize children.  You can‟t force them to do things.  You 
have to work with them to make them like school, like the teachers, like the environment; 
otherwise there is no use.   
6.  The next thing we believe is that this education should be student-centered rather than 
teacher-centered; allowing students the opportunity to explore learning as a joy rather 
than as a burden.  The biggest problem with the teaching methods here is that teachers go 
in and talk, talk, talk.  The students write it down and that is the end of the story. Students 
are not the center of the activities.   
7.  We also believe that this education is not information memorization but the 
development of critical thinking skills for inquiry-based learning.  The last thing, and 
probably most importantly, is that this education system demands highly qualified 
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teachers and administrators trained in both subject knowledge and successful pedagogical 
skills.  This is the area that we are weak in.  
8.  We also say that this education; we are talking about the Kurdish and the Kurdistani 
system of education, that this education encourages and requires teachers and 
administrators to further their knowledge and skills through professional development 
and higher degree acquisition.   
9.  We will also say that this education encourages cooperative learning and open 
communication between students and teachers.  The relationship between the student and 
teacher is the way that I have described to you.  Even at the university, the system is 
authoritarian and fear-based.  The teacher is the master and the students have to sit and 
listen.  They can‟t move.   
10.  The next thing we believe is that this education recognizes the diverse learning styles 
of all students and seeks to meet individual learning needs.  This education promotes 
parental involvement in the child‟s education and the school-community relationship.                                       
     Dr. Sadik was in the process of presenting these ten points to the Prime Minister. He 
said the education system in Kurdistan, in general, was much better than in the rest of 
Iraq.  He re-emphasized that at the horizontal level, the quantitative level; a lot of things 
had been done.  But Dr. Sadik‟s concern was at the vertical level; the philosophy of 
education.  He used a metaphor:  
I always say it is like a suit, the education system in Kurdistan, which has been tailored 
for someone else.  You can ask me to try and wear it.  You might offer to take some off 
here or add a little fabric there, but it is not my suit, it is not my proper suit.  It wasn‟t 
designed for me.  That is what I think we have to do.  I think we have to design a suit, or 
an education system, that properly fits the Kurdish student.   
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Summary 
     The previous three chapters of this document present the data generated from the 
central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education in light of the rule of 
the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party?” The data unfold, within the overlapping categories of Memory, 
Promise, and Imagination, a story of courageous, ethical, and caring leadership in the 
face of threat from the Other.  They reveal a special Kurdish spirit of modesty and 
humility that does not seek revenge.  They open up an “always already” (Gadamer 1976) 
world of Kurdistani being that “nominally submits to a central government, be it Persian, 
Arab, or Turkic, retaining as much local independence as possible” (McDowall 2004).  
Finally, the data discover a highly educated, articulate group of twelve leaders who in the 
words of Mr. Qubad Talabany “largely on their own mettle” and in Ricoeur‟s “in the face 
of threat from the Other,” are fluent in at least three languages; some five, hold 
bachelor‟s, master‟s, and doctorate degrees, mostly from the West, and have returned 
from exile and Diaspora to be a part of just education policy development in Kurdistan of 
Iraq. Chapter Eight offers a theoretical analysis of the data.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
JUSTICE  
The aim of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance and historical 
alienation. Interpretation brings together, equalizes, renders contemporary and similar 
(Ricoeur 1982: 182). 
 
Introduction 
     The previous three chapters provide a presentation of the data and an initial analysis 
within the categories of Memory, Promise, and Imagination. This chapter provides a 
secondary analysis. What the data mean is offered in light of the Ricoeurian Theory of 
Narrative Identity; the Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care and 
Solicitude; and the Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality.  A summary 
concludes the chapter. 
     Paul Ricoeur (in Stewart 1983: 382) states, “Hermeneutics can be defined no longer as 
an inquiry into the psychological intentions which are hidden beneath the text, but rather 
as the explication of being-in-the-world displayed by the text.” What is to be interpreted 
in the text is a proposed world, a world “which one could inhabit and in which one could 
project his ownmost possibilities.” Ricoeur (1982: 178) states, “What we make our own, 
what we appropriate for ourselves is not an alien experience or a distant intention, but the 
horizon of a world towards which a work directs itself.”  This work directs itself towards 
the horizon of justice.  The proposed world of this work is a just educational institution 
which the Iraqi Kurd could inhabit and in which he could “project his ownmost 
possibility of being.”  Paul Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity aims at just institutions. 
Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity 
     In Ricoeur‟s (1992:147) theory he states, “The person, understood as a character in the 
story, is not an entity distinct from his or her experiences; quite the opposite.” The person 
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shares the conditions of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative 
constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in 
constructing the story told.  It is the identity of the story that is the identity of the 
character.  This story constructs the narrative identity of twelve Kurdish leaders. 
Being-in-the-World: Memory 
     Ricoeur (1999: 8) believes that “collective identity is rooted in founding events which 
are violent events.  And that in a sense collective memory is a kind of storage of such 
violent blows, wounds and scars.” In the Chapter Five data presentation, in the section 
“Memories of the Iraqi Ba‟ath and Education” the narrative tells of wounds to Kurdish 
identity in the form of authoritarian threat, coercion and repression.  Refusal to join or 
cooperate with the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party is met with the punishment of imprisonment, in the 
case of Souham Mamand‟s father, with being denied legitimate academic promotion, as 
in the case of Dr. Susan Hussain and Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, and ultimately, with 
disappearance, in the case of students at the University of Mosul.   In the section 
“Wounding Events” Dr. Susan Hussain tells of being deeply scarred by witnessing the 
execution of her sister.  In “Arabization and the Anfal Campaign” Mr. Qubad Talabany 
tells of Kurdish suffering from the lethal blow of Anfal. He speaks of how the execution 
of Saddam Hussein does not represent justice and that “The Kurds are fearful, insecure, 
and skeptical of Iraq because of the atrocities that befell them.” In the section “The 
Department of Arabization” Ms. Soraya Serajeddini tells of how her father was punished 
for writing against the Ba‟ath Party by being forced to teach at the University of 
Baghdad. In Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity the nature of human beings is to 
embrace both a permanent aspect, sameness (idem) and a temporal aspect, selfhood (ipse) 
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of identity. It is the temporal aspect of Kurdish identity as selfhood, the ipse identity 
comprised of variability, discontinuity, and instability, where these “blows wounds and 
scars” are embodied. Ricoeur (1999:9) believes that whereas the traumatic character of 
these past humiliations brings us permanently back towards the past, the exemplary 
dimension of these same events is directed towards the future, and regulated towards 
justice.    
The Exemplary Dimension 
     Ms. Souham Mamand, in the Chapter Five data presentation, refused to report on her 
neighbors, even if it meant imprisonment of her father.  She had the courage and integrity 
not to comply with the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party.  Mr. Falah Mustafa “took up the challenge” 
and refused to join the Ba‟ath Party even if it meant humbly going to Erbil, to Sheik 
Halawi, and “selling cucumbers and tomatoes with his degree in his pocket.”  Dr. Susan 
Hussain courageously entered an Iraqi prison during the 1991 Kurdish uprising to release 
prisoners.  She wanted to “see for herself.”  Although the execution of her sister in their 
own home left a permanent wound, against all odds, and with tough resilience, she 
educated herself abroad and has returned to the University of Salahaddin.  She feels she 
has a “duty to tell” and a “duty to teach” future generations so that it never happens 
again. Ms. Soraya Serajeddini‟s father would not have his daughter subjected to Ba‟ath 
Party tyranny.  He managed, regardless of the pretext, to get her out of Iraq. Mr. Qubad 
Talabany, in our conversation, spoke of the hope and resilience of the Kurdish people in 
rebuilding the Kurdistan that Saddam destroyed during the Anfal campaign through the 
implementation of a “scorched earth” policy.   He said: 
At the end of Anfal, when Kurdistan was devastated; every village was completely 
flattened.  Hundreds of thousands of people disappeared; killed in mass graves.  
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Chemical and biological weapons were used in more than 250 towns and villages in 
separate incidents.  There was no more livestock.  The springs and wells were cemented 
up.  By 1991, Kurdistan was scorched.  At the end of the Gulf War, when we rose up, 
Saddam crushed us and millions were forced to flee to the borders.  Every tree was cut 
down for fuel to survive.  So when we came down in late 1991, early 1992, Iraqi 
Kurdistan was completely flattened.  The hope is that we have rebuilt every village.  We 
have rebuilt every town.  There are cities thriving with business and skyscrapers.  There 
is satellite TV, wireless internet, there are mobile phones; that‟s hope.  To have a 
government that is trying to do the best that it can, security forces that are patriotic and 
dedicated to professionalism; that‟s hope. Even when we were faced with extinction, we 
had hope.  Sometimes you have to get to the most bottom of the barrel, before you can 
stand up.  That‟s what we did.  We faced extinction.  Out of resilience, out of 
determination, out of just sheer grit and most importantly out of optimism, we rose up 
and got to where we are today.  We are not done.  We are not sitting back smoking our 
cigars and toasting our success.  We are continuing to move forth.  There still needs to be 
work.  We have to be in a position that we can never again be threatened like we were.  
We can never again be sent to the borders and rely on the good will of our brothers in the 
neighborhood.  That‟s hope for you.  There is always hope. 
 
       Ricoeur (1999:10) believes that “In a sense, all human activity is a kind of counter-
trend which endeavors to see that growth prevails over destruction, and that traces and 
archives are preserved and kept alive.”  The Kurdistani being-in the-world, the Kurdistani 
identity as sameness (idem), is reflected in the values of hope and resilience, courage and 
integrity, and sheer grit and determination.  This character has enabled growth to prevail 
over destruction and life to flourish in Iraqi Kurdistan. The aforementioned wounding 
events of memory overlap as broken promises and betrayed possibilities in the research 
category of Promise. 
Being-in-the-World: Promise 
     Ricoeur (1999:13) says that “by acknowledging that the history of an event involves a 
conflict of several interpretations and memories, we open up the future.  And that this 
retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications.”  In the Chapter Six 
data presentation the narrative retrieves the story of how the collapse of the 1970 Peace 
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Accord, a broken promise of the Iraqi Ba‟ath, forced those closely linked to Kurdish 
politics into exile.  It also retrieves memories of the Kurdish flee into Diaspora following 
the violent repression of the 1991 uprising.  It is in the historical “retrieval-projection” of 
these two events, Ricoeur believes, where the utopian project of a just educational 
institution may be re-animated and re-projected to realize the unfulfilled, betrayed 
possibility of Kurdish autonomy and independence. 
      In the Chapter Six section “The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse” Dr. Pary 
Karadaghi relates tales of injustice in the Iraqi educational system.  She tells of how she 
was beaten by a teacher when she was eight years old for not speaking Arabic.  She also 
tells of how professors in the universities were beaten and humiliated in the classroom by 
students who were Ba‟ath Party members.  And that the same professors were 
subsequently imprisoned by the Muhabarat for not passing Ba‟ath students.  In the 
subsection “Exile and Diaspora” Mr. Safeen Dizayee tells of distortion in the educational 
system.  The origins of the Kurdish prince Salahaddin Ayubi, an internationally known 
figure from the Crusades, were distorted by the Ba‟ath.  They taught that he was an Arab 
and from Tikrit; Saddam Hussein‟s hometown.  Both Dr. Pary Karadaghi and Mr. Safeen 
Dizayee spoke of the Ba‟ath Party‟s “master plan” of disbursing and scattering the Kurds 
as far and as wide as possible to weaken the Kurdish movement.  Mr. Safeen Dizayee 
was in exile for seventeen years. He returned in 1991. Dr. Pary Karadaghi did not return 
for twenty-one years, until the 2003 Liberation of Iraq.  She said, “This was a 
government that ruled by fear.  The Ba‟ath Party was so strong that even in Europe they 
were a threat.”  In Romania, Dr. Karadaghi was threatened and intimidated by a Ba‟ath 
Party official in the Iraqi embassy.  She had “no sympathy or allegiance for criminals like 
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him.”  He had blood on his hands. In the section on “Ba‟ath Pan-Arabism” Dr. Karadaghi 
tells of the Iraqi government awarding scholarships to students in Romania solely based 
on their identity as Arabs and their willingness to join the Ba‟ath Party.  In the same 
section Ms. Soraya Serajeddini tells of the disappointment she felt in the Palestinian 
student organization at San Francisco State University.  They couldn‟t do anything that 
was “anti-Saddam.”  The fear and the “long arm of the Ba‟ath Party” reached all the way 
to the United States.  In the section “The Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising” Dr. 
Mohammad Ihsan tells a story of exceptional courage and tenacity where after hiding in a 
basement for forty-two days he escapes out of Mosul at night by boat and walks five days 
to his home in Zakho.  In the same section Dr. Kafia Mawloud tells of the injustices she 
met in seeking her doctorate at Saddam University.  She also tells of horrific memories of 
the streets of Erbil after the crushing of the 1991 uprising.  Ricoeur believes that we 
connect past and future in an exchange between memory and expectation.  He believes 
this critical exchange is fundamental to the working through of wounding events.   
The Space of Experience and the Horizon of Expectation 
     I wouldn‟t have been in Iraqi Kurdistan, seeking stories of the inappropriate Ba‟ath 
Party education policies towards the Kurds, if not for the 2003 Liberation of Iraq.  
Rheinhart Kosselek in Ricoeur (1999:13) speaks of “a permanent tension between the 
space of experience and the horizon of expectation.” The retrieval of the wounding events 
of memory allows for the re-animation of “the horizon of expectation;” a just educational 
institution.  Hannah Arendt (1992) brings together two conditions for what she calls “the 
continuation of action;” forgiving and promising.  To forgive is to basically be liberated 
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from the burden of the past, to be untied or unbound. To promise enjoins the capacity to 
be bound by one‟s own word. 
Becoming-in-the-World: Imagination 
In the Chapter Seven data presentation in the Imagination category under “Utopian 
Education Policy” Dr. Mohammad Sadik considers a fundamental change in education 
philosophy and offers a metaphor; a “suit that fits the Kurdish student.” Ricoeur‟s theory 
of narrative identity is reassuring in that in the retelling of the story, the idem and ipse 
identity come together in the narrative unity of one‟s life, and one may integrate with 
permanence in time that which seems to be contrary . . . the repressive, violent, and 
tyrannical education policies of the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. 
A Critical Hermeneutic Model of Adult Learning 
   Traditional models of adult learning stemming from a positivist paradigm see 
learners as recipients of the knowledge controlled by the instructor.  The learner is 
presumed to have a deficiency or need that the instructor and the course content can 
fulfill.  Learning outcomes are defined and measured in terms of linear progression along 
a prescribed path towards skill mastery (Mezirow 1991: 213).  In addition to 
fundamentally disrespecting the learner, this model is limited in that it focuses solely on 
the acquisition of knowledge and fails to recognize the ontology of learning.   
Positivist Adult Learning Paradigm 
 Learner as recipient of knowledge controlled by the instructor 
 Learner presumed to have a deficiency or need that the instructor and the 
course content can fulfill 
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 Learning outcomes defined and measured in terms of linear progression 
towards skill mastery 
      A critical hermeneutic approach to adult learning places Being at the center of 
learning, rather than knowledge or knowing.  The history, traditions, identity and 
meaning making capacity of the learner come to the forefront, allowing for a quite 
different form of action to emerge from the learning experience.  The assumption is that 
when a learner reaches new understanding, he is able to appropriate a future in which his 
work and identity cohere and new meaning is brought to the professional‟s role in 
relationship to others.   
Interpretive Adult Learning Paradigm 
 Being at the center of learning rather than knowing 
 The learner‟s history, traditions, identity and ability to make meaning come to the 
forefront 
 A different form of action emerges from the learning experience 
 Assumes when learner reaches new understanding is able to appropriate future in 
which work and identity cohere. 
 New meaning brought to the professional‟s role in relationship to others 
     Putting being at the center of Kurdish education, a “suit that fits the Kurdish student,” 
is essential for entering Ricoeur‟s (1984: 64)“a kingdom of as if;” appropriating the 
proposed future world of justice. 
Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care and Solicitude 
In his theory of Care, Martin Heidegger (1962:158-159) says that there is a kind of 
solicitude that does not so much “leap in for the Other” as “leap ahead of him” in his 
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existential potentiality-for-being in order “to give his care back to him authentically, as 
such for the first time.” In his keynote speech to the World Council for Curriculum and 
Instruction at the conference “Educational Reform as an Avenue to Caring and Peace” in 
San Francisco on October 13, 2005, Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of 
Salahaddin, states: 
 Financing higher education is the responsibility of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
and the education system is funded primarily from revenue earned from the sale of oil, 
which is received from the central government in Baghdad. As we confront a radically 
new future, which is long over due, and which I believe we well deserve, we are faced 
with the challenge of radically reforming our educational system in a caring manner that 
serves our peaceful interests.  Our educational institutions must serve the best interests of 
our communities in all their diversity and not the state, to which they remained geared.  
Past excessive priority emphasis on medical and hard sciences and engineering must give 
way to a balanced educational program that raises the status of and promotes 
contributions of graduates from the humanities and the social sciences. 
 
Knowledge Production 
     In considering Dr. Sadik‟s challenge of reforming the educational system in “a caring 
manner that serves our peaceful interests” and that the system not serve “the Iraqi state, to 
which it remains geared” I evoke Paul Forman (2002) in his piece “Recent Science:  
Late-Modern and Post-Modern.” He states that epistemic relativism and latitudinarianism 
overturned the modern philosophic enterprise in the three decades deemed late-modern.  
Forman says that in post-modernism there has been no radical re-orientation in the sub-
structure of social and economic institutions and that we live in conditions of “aggravated 
modernity.” Forman (2000: 111) presents three characteristics of late-modern knowledge 
production carried over into post-modernity in aggravated form: 1) the ever accelerating 
overproduction of all cultural goods, including knowledge as perhaps fastest growing: 2) 
the proliferation of an instrumentally defined and oriented science, inseparable and 
increasingly indistinguishable from its technological correlatives (literally, techno- 
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science) and 3) the fact and more particularly the increasingly general acceptance of the 
fact that all knowledge production, and most especially techno-science, is bound to 
particular interests.  Forman says that the fact of interested and instrumental knowledge is 
no new thing but what is new is the full and complete legitimacy of such knowledge.  He 
states: 
In affirming a conception of knowledge as bound and interested, post-modernity stands in 
striking opposition to both the classical and the modern conception of science as a liberal 
pursuit, i.e., the free activity of unfettered minds, the results of which, freely published, 
will conduce to the freedom of all mankind.  Indeed, concerned as we are with notions of    
knowledge, this is the most distinctive criterion demarcating postmodern from modern 
science: post modernity begins where the production of bound and interested knowledge 
is unequivocally accepted (2002: 122). 
 
It is in the bound and interested production of knowledge that science has shaped and 
influenced our concept and implementation of policy.  Policy development and 
implementation have been based on particular economic and political interests void of 
moral or ethical considerations.  Forman refers to our contemporary knowledge 
production as interested and instrumental. The emergence of an ends-justify-the-means 
instrumental rationality in all areas of social and cultural practice Forman deems “a 
disfigured horizon.”  The proposed world, the just horizon of education policy at the 
University of Salahaddin, would consider moral and ethical implications in knowledge 
production rather than be bound and interested. 
The Normalization of Kirkuk 
     In “Democracy, Nurturance, and Community” Donna H. Kerr (1996:40-41) writes, 
“Nurture has something to do with listening carefully to each others‟ stories, but how can 
we even begin to listen through the noise of our own narratives, which are born in part as 
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defenses against cruelties-born in part of our not having been nurtured so well ourselves.”  
Kerr continues by imagining a self without social mirrors: 
Imagine that you have accepted an offer of some treatment that will render you invisible 
to yourself in all mirrors, though when others look in your direction they will still be able 
to see you.  Here I have in mind not optical mirrors; but social mirrors.  That is when you 
feel pain; no one will acknowledge your discomfort.  When you feel ebullient, no one 
will smile back.  When you grieve, no one will acknowledge your loss. When you report 
what you experience on reading a poem, no one will acknowledge your report, much less 
your experience.  Others talk only of their own experiences and the facts of matters.  And 
so on, surely ad nauseam.  If you are confident that you will once again become visible, 
and if this demonic experiment does not exceed your amusement, you may walk away 
unscathed, save for the memory of an unpleasant, jolting invisibility.  That is, you may 
still be there.  If you imagine however, that such a fate will endure until your death, your 
future is most likely doomed.  That with which you touch the world-your experience of 
the world-is lost.  Your self, your soul, is lost.”  
 
     In the Chapter Five data presentation section “Anfal and Arabization” Mr. Qubad 
Talabany calls for an international recognition of the suffering of his people, a social 
mirror to reflect and soothe their souls, world wide recognition of their grief and loss. He 
sees the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the normalization of 
Kirkuk, as an opportunity to rectify the injustices of Anfal and Arabization.  Kerr above 
offers that caring and nurture “has something to do with carefully listening to each 
others‟ stories.”  In the proposed world of a just educational institution there would be a 
Kurdish healing process, an institutionalized space of just memory for the retelling of the 
Kurdish story.  This retelling would be internationally recognized. 
Education from an Ethic of Caring 
     Ba‟ath Party policy at the university level, in Chapter Seven under “Utopian 
Education Policy,” was one of authority, fear, obedience and subordination. This legacy 
lives on in the education system. Dr. Mohammad Sadik states, “The relationship between 
the student and the teacher is the way that I have described to you.  Even at the university 
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level the system is authoritarian and fear-based.  The teacher is the master and the 
students have to sit and listen. They can‟t move.”  Education from an ethic of caring is a 
radical departure. Nel Noddings in The Challenge to Care in Schools:  An Alternative 
Approach to Education  in Chapter Two entitled “Caring” states that moral education 
from an ethic of caring has four major components: modeling, dialogue, practice, and 
confirmation. Her perspective is as follows:  
Modeling is important in most schemes of moral education, but in caring it is vital.  In 
this framework we are not trying to teach students principles and ways of applying them 
to problems through chains of mathematical reasoning.  Rather, we have to show how to 
care in our own relations with cared-fors. 
Dialogue is the second essential of moral education.  In Noddings use of the term, 
dialogue is not just talk or conversation-certainly not an oral presentation or argument in 
which the second party is merely allowed to ask an occasional question.  Dialogue is 
open-ended; that is, in a genuine dialogue, neither party knows at the outset what the 
outcome or decision will be. 
Practice: Attitudes and mentalities are shaped, at least in part, by experience.  If we want 
people to approach moral life prepared to care, we need to provide opportunities for them 
to gain skills in care giving. 
Confirmation is an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others.  When we 
confirm someone, we spot a better self and encourage its development.  We can do this 
only if we know the other well enough to see what he or she is trying to become.  We do 
not confirm people in ways we judge to be wrong.   Confirmation requires attribution of 
the best possible motive consonant with reality.  We build it from knowledge of this 
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particular other by listening carefully to what he or she tells us. Confirmation lifts us 
toward our vision of a better self.  Confirmation cannot be done by formula.  A relation 
of trust must ground it. Continuity is required. Confirmation cannot be described in terms 
of strategies; it is a loving act founded on a relation of some depth. Confirmation 
contrasts sharply with the standard mode of religious moral education.  There we usually 
find a sequence of accusation, confession, penance, and forgiveness.  The initial step, 
accusation, causes or sustains separation.  We stand in moral judgment and separate the 
other from ourselves and the moral community.  In contrast, confirmation calls us to 
remain in connection.  
    The proposed world opened up by the text, the just educational institution, is one 
where education is from an ethic of caring. 
Caring Leadership:  
the Barzanis, the Talabanys, the Karadaghis, and the Peshmerga 
     When I asked Mr. Nijyar Shemdin who the most important educator had been in his 
life his response was as follows:    
Up to the age of going to Baghdad, of course, it was my father. My father was 
instrumental in seeing to it that I got the level of education I did. If you talk about it from 
the general and political, or nationalistic point of view, though, General Barzani is really 
my educator. As humble as he was, as down to earth as he was, and I knew him 
personally, he is my educator. He is someone who did the impossible for his people in a 
very humble and a very modest way. His modesty was very powerful. Through his 
struggle, his persistence, and his perseverance his name became synonymous with the 
name of the Kurds. That is legendary for me. That has influenced me a lot. It is how to 
continue in a persistent way to fight for your rights, and eventually, you will get them. 
 
     Mr. Qubad Talabany, son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabany and grandson of Kurdish 
leader Ibrahim Ahmad, made the decision to become involved in Kurdish politics based 
on a “life changing” event.  He told me: 
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Then something happened that really changed my life.  One of the most life changing 
things for me was when my grandfather passed away, the grandfather who raised me.  
We took his body back to Kurdistan and the reception that he received was shocking. 
Literally from the Iranian border all the way to the city of Sulaymania, hundreds of 
thousands of people lined the streets; kids, grown-ups, men, women, children, all holding 
his picture. Normally that would have been a three-hour drive.  It took us eight hours that 
day because of all the people and I thought, „What have I contributed to my homeland?‟ 
My grandfather was very humble.  He was very down to earth.  People saw that. We 
didn‟t think people appreciated that during his life.  But in his death we saw how much 
people appreciated what he had contributed to the Kurdish cause.  So I decided to go 
back to Washington and give it my all.  
 
     Kurdistan has caring leaders exemplified in the historical heroes of the Kurdish 
movement; the Barzanis, the Talabanys, the Karadaghis, and the Peshmerga.   
     Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality 
Jurgen Habermas‟ (1984: xl) framework and foundation for a social theory is in the 
form of a theory of action established through communication; communicative 
competence.  Habermas (1979:32) believes that a “communicatively successful speech 
action requires that the participants in communication be prepared to reach an 
understanding, that they raise claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness and reciprocally 
impute their satisfaction.”  Habermas (1984) believes communicative rationality to be an 
aspect of learning.  Learning in Habermas‟ framework is associated with critique, 
recognizing our mistakes, and choosing another way of thinking about or doing 
something. In my conversation with Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz he speaks of a “fundamentally 
wrong premise” on the part of the U.S. The following is an excerpt from our 
conversation: 
JJ: The U.S. is very invested in Iraq remaining a coherent whole; the territorial integrity 
thing. That‟s a problem isn‟t it? 
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SQ:  This is exactly what the fundamentally wrong premise was on which America based 
this thing.  America thought  . . . there are two basic reasons why Iraq, both as a state and 
as a community, has not succeeded right from the beginning.  First of all, Iraq was 
manufactured.  
JJ:  Arbitrary or constructed? 
SQ:  Yes, they appended different parts to make this artificial entity. What was then 
called Southern Kurdistan or the Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul was arbitrarily annexed for 
economic reasons; basically oil. Right from day one, Iraq suffered two things; first, it 
could not really put together a system of government that could serve the people as a 
heterogeneous community.  It is a mosaic of nations; you know minorities and sects and 
religions. Second, it never really faced up to the Kurdish question.  The Kurdish question 
has remained throughout these eighty odd years as the basic problem of Iraq.  This is 
where that idea of centralization comes in. They [The Arabs] have never seen Iraq able to 
give the Kurds what‟s due them.  They have always seen it in terms of Baghdad 
controlling everything.  Therefore this thing has festered throughout all these years.  It 
has become much more complicated.  It has created a whole background of mistrust, I am 
afraid.  We have worked together and we are working together, but frankly we don‟t trust 
each other.  And for the Kurds, they have absolutely no reason to trust the Arabs. 
     He continued by saying that it was bad enough before Saddam Hussein, but that after 
Halabja, after Anfal, after Arabization there was mistrust behind the entire question of 
federalism.  He stated that “America made the mistake of thinking that Iraq was a 
country.  Iraq never became a country.”  I said I didn‟t think the U.S. wanted to be guilty 
of the Kurds breaking off from Iraq.  He continued by saying: 
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But you see it is very difficult for the Kurds. The point is that there are forces among the 
Americans, the British, and everyone else, who want to, almost at their own will, create 
this Iraq. This idea built on the wrong premise.  The premise that these three major 
groups; the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds, can in a friendly and harmonious way, sit 
down and work these things out. 
 
     I added that the Americans are ignoring history and looking at Iraq as if it were like 
the United States and that the Kurds are not a minority in the region, they are 
marginalized. Dr. Qazzaz concluded by saying: 
We believe in the fact that we are one of the two major nationalities.  We are living on 
our own land.  This part of Kurdistan belongs to another part that is greater.  Kurdistan is 
a divided country.  In other words, we see ourselves equal to the Arabs in every aspect.  
So, it is not working.  The problem is that the Americans came with some preconceived 
ideas.  And they didn‟t want to change them.   
 
     Based on Habermas‟ theory, the Americans need to “recognize their mistakes and 
choose another way of thinking about or doing something.” A federal, pluralistic, 
democratic system is the final part of the proposed world of justice, yet it is specifically a 
Kurdish creation. 
Summary 
       Chapter Eight provides a theoretical analysis of the data.  Violent and repressive 
education policies in Iraqi Kurdistan are the structure that holds the narrative together. 
The rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party (1968-2003) is the axial moment 
by which the disparate events of Kurdish repression are temporally measured.  The data 
travel from the repression of Kurdish aspirations of independence within the Vilayet of 
Mosul in the 1920s, to the non-implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, 
The Normalization of Kirkuk, by October 1, 2008. The whole data set is one of Kurdish 
agents overcoming the injustices of the Iraqi educational system; a significant medium 
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for interpreting social and political reality.  The work directs itself towards the horizon of 
justice.  The proposed world of the work is a just educational institution which the Iraqi 
Kurd could inhabit and in which he could “project his ownmost possibility of being.” 
Chapter Nine provides a summary, findings, implications, and personal reflections. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS,  
AND PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
 
Summary   
     The research issue addressed in this study is the inappropriate education policies 
implemented on the Kurds of Iraq during the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath 
Party (1968-2003). Under the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, which combines 
socialism, militarism, nationalism, and pan-Arabism, Kurdish students were threatened, 
intimidated, and coerced, denied legitimate academic achievement, imprisoned, tortured, 
and executed. Kurds are not Arabs. They are a distinct ethnic group with a distinct 
language and culture. They embrace democratic values and continue to seek a pluralistic, 
federal system within Iraq. The collapse of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord, the wake 
of the 1991 Kurdish uprising, and the Anfal campaign with its plan of Arabization, were 
cycles of violence and repression in Iraqi Kurdish history. The independence of the 
Kurdish Autonomous Region in 1991, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in 1992 and its successful rule, and the 2003 Liberation of Iraq with 
democratic elections and a new constitution, have encouraged hope and possibility of a 
better future for the Kurds. The aim of this study is to reflect critical issues in education 
policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq and to propose subsequent policy 
recommendations as higher education there moves away from a centralized, Arabized, 
tyrannical past, and moves closer to a federated, pluralistic, and democratic future. 
     The Kurds have inhabited their resource rich, mountainous homeland for more than 
4,000 years. Along with the Assyrians, they are the oldest people in the region. With the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I Britain and France divided 
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Kurdistan amongst Turkey (43% of the total area of Kurdistan), Iran (31%), Iraq (18%), 
Syria (6%), and the former Soviet Union (2%).  Due to inaccurate census, Kurdish 
population estimates vary. Akram Jaff (2003) estimates the population of Kurds 
worldwide to be 39.25 million, with 15 million residing in Turkey, 11 million in Iran, 6 
million in Iraq, 1.5 million in Syria, and 5.25 million in Diaspora. 
     The literature in English on education in Kurdistan reveals a history carried out by 
various agents with the intent of repressing the Kurdish language, Kurdish culture, and 
Kurdish aspirations of independence. David McDowall (2004) states, “With the Arab 
conquests the Kurds emerged from historical obscurity, rapidly confirming the longevity 
of their reputation for political dissidence.” The Kurds first came into contact with the 
Arab armies in 637 with the latter‟s conquest of Mesopotamia.  The Kurdish tribes tried 
to withstand the Muslim armies between 639 and 644, yet eventually the Kurdish chiefs 
one by one submitted to the Arabs and Islam.  McDowall maintains that the pattern of 
nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab, or subsequently Turkic, 
alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible, became an enduring 
theme in Kurdish political life.  Amir Hassanpour (1993) chronicles the struggle of the 
Kurdish people to promote their national language and education while under the control 
of hostile Ottoman, Arab, and Persian empires.  Hassanpour asserts that there is an 
intimate connection between state power and literacy in the process of gaining 
independence for a unified nation.  Hassanpour (1996) argues that only a democratic 
Kurdistan could promote education that fosters nation building, self-determination and 
autonomy.  Yosef Gottlieb (1991) advances that entrenched underdevelopment in 
Kurdistan is due to the social and spatial configuration of post-colonial states and that the 
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colonies were demarcated to further the economic and strategic interests of the 
metropolitan powers. Accordingly, the indigenization of colonial space in the form of the 
post-colonial state perpetuates territorial incongruities between historical geo-ethnic 
regions and formal borders.  Gotlieb states that the historical and contemporary 
relationship of the Kurds to Kurdistan exemplifies both the integrity of ethnicity and 
territory and the disastrous consequences for development when this relationship is 
violated.  He concludes that development activity should be defined by anthropological 
and ecological continuities.  Gina Lennox (2001:13) offers that Kurdistan is rich in both 
water and oil and because of this “neither the ruling nation states nor their international 
allies want a united, independent Kurdistan, or a series of autonomous, federal states 
within present borders.”  Abbas Vali (2003) asserts that the concepts of sovereignty and 
legitimacy entailed in democratic theory engender ethnic and national conflict, 
statelessness, and opposition to the modern nation-state.  And finally, Shafiq Qazzaz 
(1971) emphasizes that the Kurdish issue is a chronic source of instability and tension in 
Middle Eastern politics and must be dealt with and solved.    
     The research was carried out within the participatory critical hermeneutic tradition as 
outlined in Herda (1999). In this tradition language takes the place of the perceptual 
world of objects so that texts become the objects from which human existence is read.  
The text (discourse fixed by writing [Ricoeur 1982: 143]) and social actions that are 
recorded (Herda 1990: 51) allow us to recognize, challenge, and evaluate our worlds of 
action as well as envision new, possible worlds.  Paul Ricoeur‟s theories of text 
interpretation, narrative identity, and threefold mimesis are foundational to the study.  
Clifford Geertz‟ theory of interpretive ethnography, Martin Heidegger‟s concept of being 
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as it relates to care, solicitude and language, and Jurgen Habermas‟ theory of 
communicative rationality further ground the work. Ricoeur (1982: 112) describes 
hermeneutics as “the explication of being-in-the world displayed by the text” and that 
“the meaning of a text lies not behind the text but in front of it” (1982: 177). What is to 
be interpreted in the text, according to Ricoeur (1982: 112), is a “proposed world which 
one could inhabit and in which one could project his ownmost possibilities.”   
     The categories of the inquiry, Memory, Promise, and Imagination, derive from 
Ricoeur (1999:9) in which he offers that through the mediating act of narrative we may 
begin to heal humiliating, traumatic memories and look to a just future by extracting the 
exemplarity of the event, rather than the factuality. The traumatic character of past 
humiliations, according to Ricoeur, brings us permanently back towards the past, whereas 
the exemplary dimension of the same events is directed towards the future and regulated 
towards justice.  Ricoeur believes it is the power of justice to be just regarding victims, 
just regarding victors, and just towards new institutions by means of which we may 
prevent the same events from recurring in the future. In the historical retrieval-projection 
of wounding events of memory we may re-animate and re-project the broken promises 
and unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities of the past.  We open possibilities for the future by 
what is remembered and imagined in the present.  The horizon of this study is justice. 
     The central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education?” was 
answered in light of the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. Twelve 
Kurdish leaders participated in the study from several organizations: the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, the University of Salahaddin, Kurdish Human Rights Watch, and 
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the Kurdish National Congress of North America. The one hour research conversations 
were recorded in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq and in Washington, D.C.   
   In the Memory category the narrative tells of how refusal to join or cooperate with the 
Iraqi Ba‟ath Party at school or university is met with the punishment of imprisonment, in 
the case of Ms. Souham Mamand‟s father, with being denied legitimate academic 
promotion, in the case of Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, Dr. Susan Hussain, Dr. Kafia 
Mawloud, and Ms. Souham Mamand, and ultimately with disappearance in the case of 
students in an exam at the University of Mosul.  The story also tells of Dr. Susan Hussain 
being deeply scarred by witnessing the execution of her sister in their home and of the 
Kurdish suffering from the lethal blow of Anfal.  Mr. Qubad Talabany speaks of how the 
execution of Saddam Hussein does not represent justice and he believes there needs to be 
a large scale national reconciliation process if there is to be an Iraq, if Iraq is to exist as a 
state.  He emphasizes that “The Kurds are fearful, insecure, and skeptical of Iraq because 
of the atrocities that befell them.” The Kurds feel genocide was carried out against them 
and that the world is moving on without having recognized their suffering.  
     The narrative in the Promise category speaks of  how betrayed possibilities of the Iraqi 
Ba‟ath; the unraveling of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord and the violent wake of the 
1991 Kurdish uprising with concomitant exile and flees into Diaspora, have influenced 
the education of the Iraqi Kurd.  Dr. Pary Karadaghi, daughter of Kurdish leader Mustafa 
Karadaghi, pursued her medical degree in Romania. She recounts the terror and fear with 
which the Ba‟ath ruled even in Diaspora.  She relates, “There were many, many Iraqi 
people in the Diaspora who went into Iraqi embassies and never came out.  They were 
found in diplomatic pouches.  Their heads had been sent back to their family members.” 
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There was a death warrant out on Dr. Karadaghi‟s father.  Her passport had been 
confiscated when she entered Romania.  A Ba‟ath official at the Iraqi embassy in 
Bucharest suggested it would be very easy for her to get an Iraqi passport and a 
scholarship.  The catch was frightening.  He actually told her, “All we need is your 
father.” She refused to cooperate and left.  She did not see an Iraqi until the 2003 
Liberation, twenty-one years later. She was still afraid.    
      The narrative in the Imagination category considers what influence the 2003 Iraq War 
has had on education policy development and how the Kurds envision the future for 
themselves. Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President at the University of Salahaddin, comments 
that the situation is “excellent in some ways now that Saddam is gone” yet feels there is a 
lot to be done in the Kurdistan region regarding education. He asserts that there have 
been quantitative achievements in the provision of education by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, yet no fundamental shift in the philosophy of education.  
Findings    
     The data reveal a Kurdish nation deeply scarred by memories of violent and repressive 
Ba‟ath Party education policies. The data also reveal a very special Kurdish spirit of 
modesty and humility that does not seek revenge and caring Kurdish leadership that seeks 
to radically reform the education system in a manner that serves their peaceful interests.  
Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of Salahaddin, envisions a Kurdistani 
education system which would: 
1. Be based on the values, traditions, history, economy, and ideals of its people.  
2. Promote a diverse world view. 
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3. Promote democratic values and civic responsibility in both faculty and 
students. 
4. Recognize the history and contributions of all world religions. 
5. Respect the student and encourage open communication between students and 
teachers. 
6. Encourage and require faculty professional development and higher degree 
acquisition. 
     These recommendations were reflected in all the conversation I had on the issues 
facing leadership in education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.   
Implications  
     Based on my research and findings, I believe if seriously considered in light of the 
development of a Kurdistani education philosophy, the following models would promote 
a movement from theory into practice; the appropriation of a new way of Kurdish being.  
I suggest:  
1. A critical hermeneutic model of adult learning.  This model places being at the center 
of learning rather than knowledge or knowing.  The history, traditions, identity and 
meaning making capacity of the learner come to the forefront.   
2. A philosophical model of education from an ethic of caring. This model establishes 
caring and nurturance as the bedrock of all successful education in contrast to authority, 
obedience, fear, and subordination. 
3. A critical hermeneutic research model based on moral and ethical principles. This 
model is in contrast to one bound and interested to particular political or economic ends 
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with understanding; a fusion of horizons, as the research goal of this model (Herda 1999: 
94-95). 
 4. A critical hermeneutic model of policy development. In this model policy is developed 
through the hermeneutic circle of reflection, narrative, conversation, interpretation 
(assessment), understanding and appropriation. 
     I also recommend further research on institutionalizing social and academic space for 
the retelling of the Kurdish story.  
Personal Reflections 
“Understanding is not concerned with grasping a fact but with  
apprehending a possibility of being (Ricoeur: 1982: 56).” 
 
     In reflecting upon what this experience has meant in my life and what I have learned, I 
rejoice in recognizing the limitations of objectivity and cultural relativism.  I have found 
new courage and confidence in critical hermeneutic theory which has led me to risk my 
own prejudices and to authentically attempt to recognize, challenge, and evaluate my 
world, our world, the world.  I have come to a new place in my understanding of 
leadership, democratic theory, policy analysis, and justice.  It is a place that I hope will be 
overcome and fused with future horizons and that I will continue to authentically 
question, laying open and holding open, possibilities that suspend the presumed finality 
of this text and my current opinions. 
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Appendix: A 
University of San Francisco 
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions 
 
Date 
 
Participant’s Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr. /Ms.: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in an exploration of my dissertation topic.  As we 
discussed, my study examines education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.  It is my 
intention that this research will reflect critical issues and will propose subsequent policy 
recommendations for the University of Salahaddin and its English language department. 
 
Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent form, a copy 
of which you will keep.  By signing, you will be granting me permission to tape record 
and transcribe our conversation.  In this way, our conversations will provide data for the 
analysis of the subject I have described.  Once transcribed, I will provide you with a copy 
of our conversation for your review, comments and editing.  You may add to or delete 
any section of the conversation at that time.  Once I have received your approval of the 
transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our conversation.  Your name and 
affiliation, the data that you contribute, and the date of our conversation will not be held 
confidential. 
 
Below you will find a series of proposed questions.  These questions are intended as 
guidelines to direct our conversation.  I would like to emphasize that I am seeking stories 
that reflect your personal history and experience with the topic at hand.  My hope is that 
our conversation will provide an opportunity for us both to reach new understandings. 
 
Reflecting upon your experience, please consider the following questions: 
 
 What is the story of your education? 
 
 What influence did the Iraqi Ba’ath Party have on your education?   
 
 How did Al-Anfal campaign influence your education or your family? 
 
 How did the Iran-Iraq War influence your education? 
 
 Where were you during the Kurdish Uprising of 1991?  
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 How did the Gulf War (1990-1991) influence your education? 
 
 If you left Kurdistan, please relate why and why you have returned. 
 
 What influence has the 2003 Iraq War had on education policy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan? 
 
 What influence have the Iraqi elections on January 30, 2005 and the Iraqi 
constitution of October 15, 2005 had on education policy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan? 
 
 How would you imagine education policy in the Kurdistan utopia of your 
dreams? 
 
  
 
Again, thank you for your willingness to participate.  I look forward to our conversation. 
 
Most sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Ms. Jessica Jastad 
Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
School of Education 
Organization and Leadership: Pacific Leadership International Emphasis 
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Appendix: B 
University of San Francisco 
Consent to Be a Research Participant 
 
Purpose and Background 
Ms. Jessica Jastad, doctoral student in the School of Education at the University of San 
Francisco, has asked me to participate in her research which examines education policy 
development in Kurdistan, Iraq.  This research intends to reflect critical issues in 
education policy development and propose subsequent recommendations for the 
University of Salahaddin and its English language department. 
 
Procedures   
I agree, as part of this study, to participant in conversations with the researcher regarding 
education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.  These conversations will reflect my 
story and experience in education.  I agree that Ms. Jastad may record our conversation, 
which will be transcribed. A copy of the transcript will be returned to me for review, 
editing, and approval prior to use in data analysis.  I understand that I may withdraw from 
the study at any time, that I may discontinue the conversation at any point, and request 
any changes or deletions.  My participation in this research project is voluntary, and any 
data I contribute to this study will not be confidential. I agree that all data collected 
during the research process, and my name, may be used in the dissertation and 
subsequent publications. 
 
Risks and Discomforts 
I am free to decline to answer any questions or stop the conversation at any point.  I may 
also withdraw my participation at any time.  I understand that I may request to remove 
my entire transcript from the study.  I also understand that I may be identified and quoted 
in the dissertation and subsequent publications. 
 
Benefits 
I will receive no monetary compensation for my participation.  The anticipated benefit of 
this conversation to me is the opportunity for personal reflection about the topic at hand. 
 
Alternatives 
I am free to elect not to participate in this study. 
 
Cost 
There will be no cost to me in taking part in this study. 
 
Questions 
If I have any questions or comments about the study, I may contact Ms. Jessica Jastad or  
her advisor, Dr. Ellen Herda, at the University of San Francisco, (415) 422-2075.  Should 
I not wish to address comments to either of them, I may contact the office of the 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects Monday through Friday 
between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM Pacific Standard Time by calling (415) 422-6091, or by 
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writing to the IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130 
Fulton Street, San Francisco, California 94117-1080, USA. 
 
Consent to Participate in Research 
I have been given a copy of this consent letter to keep.  I understand that my participation 
in the dissertation research conducted by Ms. Jessica Jastad is voluntary.  I fully 
understand and agree with the above procedures and conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature                                                                          Date 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature                                                                          Date 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s Name (Print)                                                                     Date 
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Appendix: C 
University of San Francisco 
Letter of Confirmation 
 
 
Date 
 
Participant’s Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr. /Ms.: 
 
Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to have a conversation with you 
about your experiences and reflections on education policy development in Kurdistan, 
Iraq.  I am confirming our meeting on ___________________________.  
Please let me know if something requires you to change our arranged date, time, or place. 
 
With your permission, I will tape record our conversation, transcribe the tapes into a 
written text, and submit it to you for your review.  After you have reviewed the text, I 
would like to discuss our conversation again and include any follow-up thoughts and 
comments you might have.  Please know that data for this research are not confidential. 
 
The exchange of ideas in conversation is the format for participatory research.  This 
process encourages you to comment upon, add to, or delete portions of the transcript.  In 
addition, this process allows you to reflect upon our conversation.  Only after you have 
approved the transcript will I proceed to analyze the text of our conversation. 
 
Again, thank you for your willingness to participate.  I look forward to our conversation. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Ms. Jessica Jastad 
Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
School of Education 
Organization and Leadership; Pacific Leadership International Emphasis 
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Appendix: D 
University of San Francisco 
Thank you and Follow-Up Letter 
 
 
Date 
 
Participant Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr. / Ms.: 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me on___________.  I appreciate your 
willingness to participate in my research.  I believe our conversation will be valuable to 
my dissertation. 
 
I have attached a copy of our transcribed conversation for your review and approval.  The 
transcript once reviewed and approved by you, will provide the basis for data analysis. As 
we have discussed, data from this research are not confidential. 
 
Please review the attached transcript and add changes or clarifying comments you deem 
appropriate. 
 
Again, thank you for your generous participation. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Ms. Jessica Jastad 
Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
School of Education 
Organization and Leadership: Pacific Leadership International Emphasis 
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APPENDIX: E 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir 
Director 
Office of Foreign Relations 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Safeen Dizayee 
Director of External Relations 
Kurdistan Democratic Party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Susan Hussain 
Professor  
University of Salahaddin 
 131 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Mohammad Ihsan 
Minister of External Affairs 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Pary Karadaghi 
Director  
Kurdish Human Rights Watch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ms. Souham Mamand  
Assistant 
Office of Foreign Relations 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
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Dr. Kafia Mawloud 
Dean of Nursing College 
University of Salahaddin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Narin Mayiwar 
Professor 
University of Salahaddin 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz 
Minister of Humanitarian Aid  
and Cooperation 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
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Dr. Mohammad Sadik 
President  
University of Salahaddin 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ms. Soraya Serajeddini 
Vice President  
Kurdish National Congress 
of North America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Nijyar Shemdin 
Former Representative to the 
UN/USA/Canada 
Kurdistan Regional Government 
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Mr. Qubad Talabany 
Representative to the USA 
Kurdistan Regional Government  
 
  
